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ABSTRACT
The term wrongful conviction typically refers to the convic-
tion or adjudication of individuals who are factually innocent.
Decades of research has rightfully focused on uncovering con-
tributing factors of convictions of factually innocent people to in-
form policy and practice.  However, in this paper we expand our
conceptualization of wrongful conviction.  Specifically, we pro-
pose a redefinition that includes other miscarriages of justice:  A
wrongful conviction is a conviction or adjudication for someone
who never should have been involved in the juvenile or criminal
legal system in the first place.  Although there are various miscar-
riages of justice that might appropriately be categorized under
this reconceptualization, in this paper we focus specifically on
those whose system involvement was the result of engaging in no
wrongdoing beyond normative adolescent behavior.  With this
reconceptualization in mind, we highlight how the intersection of
youthfulness and race puts youth of color at risk of both wrongful
conviction based on factual innocence and wrongful conviction
based on criminalization of normative youthful behavior.  We
rely on a cumulative disadvantage framework to demonstrate
how system responses to both youthfulness and race drive youth
of color deeper into the legal system and further contribute to
their wrongful conviction.  In doing so, we describe how the dis-
advantage created by youthfulness and racial bias compound
within and across each stage of system processing.  We also illus-
trate that it is the behavior of youth of color, not white youth,
that is disproportionately criminalized.  Youth of color are cur-
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rently and have historically been overrepresented within the ju-
venile and criminal legal systems; this disparity can be seen even
amongst the youngest system-involved youth.  We conclude by
presenting recommendations for future research efforts to ac-
count for multiple system time points, race, and youthfulness.  Fi-
nally, we describe what we believe to be important
considerations for changes to policy and practice that might be-
gin to correct the unnecessary and disproportionate wrongful
charging and conviction of youth of color.
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INTRODUCTION
Huwe Burton was 16 years old when he came home to find his
mother murdered; he called 911.  He was soon the investigators’
primary suspect and was wrongfully accused of murdering his
mother.  Huwe’s story is similar to that of other wrongfully con-
victed youth:  He was a Black teen who was interrogated without an
attorney present, denied contact with his father, threatened by po-
lice if he did not cooperate, wrongly implicated by someone else
who likely was involved with the crime, and had exculpatory evi-
dence withheld by the prosecutor.  This combination of events oc-
curring two days after losing his mother led Huwe to falsely confess
to being high on crack cocaine and fatally stabbing his mother.  His
confession was full of contradictory statements that did not support
the physical evidence of what had actually happened that night.
Before his trial, Huwe recanted his confession and argued it was the
result of coercive interrogation practices.  Nevertheless, Huwe was
convicted of second-degree murder and spent the next 18 years be-
hind bars before being paroled.  Huwe’s father drained his financial
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resources on Huwe’s defense and appeals and died while Huwe was
still in prison.  At 45 years old, a decade after his release, Huwe was
finally exonerated and his charges dismissed.1
At 13 years old, Michael was an active, responsible big brother
living with his parents in central Maryland.  While he was hanging
out with friends, he and his friend stole another teen’s cellphone.
This was Michael’s first “offense” and gained him entrance to the
juvenile justice system.  After he pled “involved,” the Department
of Juvenile Services recommended that he write an apology letter
for stealing the iPhone and remain at home under community su-
pervision while receiving counseling and abiding by a curfew.  The
judge overseeing Michael’s case disagreed.  Instead, the judge sent
Michael to a 90-day wilderness program for juvenile offenders two-
hours away from his parents’ home.  Michael’s stay at the wilder-
ness program was the first stop on an eight-facility tour through the
Maryland juvenile justice system for this young Black boy, includ-
ing the state’s maximum-security facility for juveniles.  Facility staff
reports described him as becoming increasingly verbally abusive
and instigating altercations.  Discharge recommendations consist-
ently suggested that he would fare better at home with his family
under community supervision.  The interventions were doing more
harm than good.  The judge continued confining Michael, who ulti-
mately spent 891 days and three birthdays incarcerated for stealing
another teen’s iPhone; a harsher punishment than an adult in the
criminal legal system would have faced.  As Michael’s mother put
it, “It felt like my son had been kidnapped.”  When he finally re-
turned home, she struggled to connect with him.  He was less en-
gaged in school and more defiant and angrier than before.  Within
four months of returning home, he was rearrested and facing adult-
charges for car theft.2
Though these stories differ in several important ways, they
both represent cautionary tales of wrongful or problematic system
involvement in the lives of young, Black boys.  Although Huwe
Burton was factually innocent and Michael factually guilty, both
1. See Ken Otterbourg, Huwe Burton, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS
(Oct. 29, 2020), http://bit.ly/3uJoy46 [https://perma.cc/65PM-CPLS]; Huwe Burton,
BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC: CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://bit.ly/
2MCYCG2 [https://perma.cc/7R6J-Y8LR] (last visited Jan. 26, 2020); Leonard
Greene, Exonerated Bronx Man Who Spent 20 Years in Jail Suing City Over
Wrongful Murder Conviction, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020), http://bit.ly/
3bLwsRC [https://perma.cc/9835-B72E].
2. See Erica L. Green, A Stolen Cellphone, Then an Odyssey Through Mary-
land’s Juvenile Justice System, BALT. SUN (Dec. 30, 2020), http://bit.ly/2PkOxhY
[https://perma.cc/RV7R-7BNB].
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lives were unnecessarily set off course by legal system involvement.
By the time Huwe was finally released, he had lived more time in-
carcerated than free.  According to the National Registry for Exon-
erations, about a quarter of exonerees were teenagers when they
were accused, just over 10 percent were under 18, and they waited
an average of 14 years before being exonerated.3  The outrage at
the legal actors who facilitated the system’s unjust suspicion and
ultimate conviction of people like Huwe Burton is rightfully placed.
Michael’s story represents a more common and insidious form
of system involvement that systematically and disproportionately
affects the lives of youth of Color.  Arresting and charging youth
like Michael unnecessarily places them on an often-irreversible tra-
jectory toward increasing system involvement.  Instead of treating
problem behaviors as teachable moments, our society now func-
tions such that “[a] typical schoolyard fight is labeled as a felony
assault, and students who play ‘catch’ with a teacher’s hat are
charged with robbery.”4  Juvenile justice stakeholders and scientists
alike recognize that applying overly punitive sanctions to low-risk
youth can actually increase recidivism.5  Rule-breaking, limit-test-
ing, and risky behavior are a normal—and necessary—part of ado-
lescent development; it is how youth grow, learn, and appreciate
the responsibilities that will eventually be bestowed upon them as
adults.6  Most adolescents will age out of this behavior with little to
no intervention at all, which is partially why the legal system does
not hold youth to the same level of legal culpability as adults.7
Michael’s case is characteristic of how system involvement
problematizes and exacerbates typical adolescent behavior; yet
3. See Detailed View, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://bit.ly/
3dUMGdL [https://perma.cc/X36R-MGKK] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
4. Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communi-
ties of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 383, 386 (2013).
5. See James Bonta & D. A. Andrews, Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Of-
fender Assessment and Rehabilitation, 6 REHAB. 1, 9 (2007); Leah Brogan, Emily
Haney-Caron, Amanda NeMoyer & David DeMatteo, Applying the Risk-Needs-
Responsivity (RNR) Model to Juvenile Justice, 40 CRIM. JUST. REV. 277, 280
(2015).
6. See Natasha Duell & Laurence Steinberg, Positive Risk Taking in Adoles-
cence, 13 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 48, 48 (2019).
7. See generally Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Su-
preme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REV.
NEUROSCIENCE 513 (2013).  In a series of cases over the past three decades, the
U.S. Supreme Court has applied adolescent developmental science to rulings re-
stricting death penalty and life without parole sentences for youth under age 18 at
the time of the offense in part because of their reduced culpability. Id. at 514. See
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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there is very little outrage or pushback for this overreaching by the
legal system.
In this Article, we argue that each of these cases is best concep-
tualized as a type of wrongful conviction, and we argue for an ex-
pansion of prevailing definitions of wrongful conviction in research,
scholarship, and policy.  Additionally, we complicate traditional
analyses of wrongful conviction with youthful status and racial bias,
which we argue both result in risk for wrongful conviction both
greater in degree and of a different nature than the risk faced by a
White adult.  This Article is a first attempt to explore the ways in
which youth—particularly youth of Color—experience risk of a
wrongful conviction from the very beginning of justice system
processing, and the ways in which this risk is built upon and com-
pounded at every subsequent stage.
Part I of this Article argues for an expansion of the term
wrongful conviction to include two types of wrongful conviction:
Convictions of individuals who are factually innocent and convic-
tions of individuals whose conduct has been inappropriately
criminalized.  Part II provides an overview of adolescent develop-
ment science and explores how this science should lead to a particu-
lar focus on the issue of wrongful convictions among youth, as well
as how a youth’s race shapes legal conceptions of adolescent devel-
opment.  In Part III, we then analyze the ways in which youth face
particular risk of wrongful conviction at every stage of justice sys-
tem processing, exploring both research and scholarship on the risk
posed by youthfulness as well as the risk posed by minoritized racial
status.  Part IV applies this conceptualization of risk of youthful
wrongful conviction to make recommendations for research, legal
practice, and policy.  Specifically, we call for researchers to develop
more complex research designs that account for race, youthfulness,
and multiple stages of system contact in exploring wrongful convic-
tions of both types discussed in this Article.  We draw on recom-
mendations for practice that individual prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges can implement now, while the research litera-
ture is still developing—utilizing their discretion to move kids out
of the system, reducing the risks of wrongful conviction and its last-
ing consequences.  Finally, we call for major policy changes to ad-
dress the overcriminalization of youth related to policing
adolescence, building robust systems for providing community-
based interventions for youth outside of the justice system, and en-
suring youth strong legal representation through all stages of
processing, including post-disposition.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION IN THE MODERN
JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Convicted Though Innocent: The Traditional Wrongful
Conviction Lens
The case of Huwe Burton, described above, typifies the wrong-
ful convictions long studied by legal scholars and social scientists8
and recently made prominent in public discourse by portrayals in
popular media.9  Convictions of those who are factually innocent
are now a well-studied and publicly recognized phenomenon.  Con-
sensus that wrongful conviction refers to the conviction of people
who are factually innocent is so widely accepted that much of the
scholarly literature on wrongful convictions does not define the
term.10  Research-to-date has focused on identifying the frequency
of, risk factors for, and causes of factually innocent wrongful
convictions.11
8. American wrongful convictions legal scholarship began more than 100
years ago and burgeoned into a robust area of study in the late 1980s. See Jon B.
Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions after a
Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 826–29 (2010) [herein-
after Gould & Leo].  More recently, the field of legal psychology has produced a
large body of research on wrongful convictions, much of it focused on interroga-
tions, forensic confirmation bias, eyewitness testimony, and jury decision making.
See Kyle C. Scherr, Allison D. Redlich & Saul M. Kassin, Cumulative Disadvan-
tage: A Psychological Framework for Understanding How Innocence Can Lead to
Confession, Wrongful Conviction, and Beyond, 15 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 353,
354–56 (2020).
9. See Greg Stratton, Wrongful Conviction, Pop Culture, and Achieving Jus-
tice in the Digital Age, in CRIME, DEVIANCE AND POPULAR CULTURE: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 177, 177–79 (Dimitris Akrivos &
Alexandros K. Antoniou eds., 2019).  Over the last decade, multiple podcasts and
television shows have reported in-depth explorations of cases of possible wrongful
conviction, reaching a combined tens of millions of viewers and listeners.  For ex-
ample, the 2014 podcast Serial, one of the most popular podcasts ever, detailed the
murder conviction of a teenager and explored the possibility of his innocence.  Sa-
rah Koenig & Julie Snyder, Serial (2014), https://bit.ly/3s1gfhc [https://perma.cc/
UB9U-WTZL].  A year later, the Netflix documentary series Making a Murderer
focused on a man who had been exonerated for sexual assault and attempted mur-
der, but was subsequently charged with another murder (along with his teenage
nephew, Brendan Dassey); the series presented this murder conviction as also very
questionable and highlighted the likelihood that a confession given by Dassey was
a false confession. MAKING A MURDERER (Netflix 2015); Stratton, supra.  More
recently, Netflix released When They See Us, a 2019 mini-series following the
proven wrongful convictions of the so-called Central Park Five for a violent rape in
the 1980s.  Gabrielle Bruney, An Excruciating Timeline of the Central Park Five
Tragedy, ESQUIRE (May 31, 2019), http://bit.ly/3cd3tGr [https://perma.cc/P8EK-
LPBD].
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Criminology of Wrongful Conviction: A
Decade Later, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 82 (2017).
11. See generally Gould & Leo, supra note 8.
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Estimates of the frequency of wrongful convictions of individu-
als who are factually innocent draw on cases of proven exonerations
to gauge the scope of the problem, though the true rate of wrongful
convictions is likely unknowable.12  These estimates—relying on a
large number of assumptions and extrapolating from a variety of
data sources—suggest that three to five percent of convictions may
be of someone who is factually innocent.13  More recently, research
on guilty pleas has raised the possibility that, in addition to the sig-
nificant number of wrongful convictions by jury verdicts, a large
number of cases resolved via guilty plea may also constitute wrong-
ful convictions.14  Because the above estimates predate much of the
research on false guilty pleas, and guilty pleas make up 95 percent
of convictions but only 10 percent of known exonerations,15 ac-
counting for wrongful convictions resulting from a guilty plea may
substantially increase estimates of convictions of factually innocent
defendants.
Given the near consensus that convictions of factually innocent
defendants occur at an unacceptably high rate within the United
States criminal justice system, researchers have sought to identify
defendant risk factors that increase the likelihood of wrongful con-
victions as well as the mechanisms through which the system con-
12. Because individuals convicted of a crime may be motivated to claim fac-
tual innocence even when they are factually guilty, emphasis has been placed on
proven exonerations, which are a poor proxy for the true scope of the problem
because proven exoneration almost exclusively occurs for only the most serious
charges—rape and murder.  This is commonly the result of exonerations based on
DNA evidence, which is unavailable for most types of crime, as well as due to the
very large amount of resources necessary to prove a conviction was wrongful—
resources that will only be expended when the wrongfully imposed sentence is very
severe.  Gould & Leo, supra note 8, at 834–35.
13. Id. at 832. But see Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s Wrongful Con-
viction Rate? Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom about the Prevalence of
Wrongful Convictions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 815 (2018).
14. See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich, Stephanos Bibas, Vanessa A. Edkins & Ste-
phanie Madon, The Psychology of Defendant Plea Decision Making, 72 AM. PYCH.
339, 348–49 (2017).  More than a third (37 percent) of offenders with mental illness
report having falsely pled guilty at least once, as do 18 percent of juvenile offend-
ers. Id.  See generally Allison D. Redlich, Alicia Summers, & Stephen Hoover,
Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders with
Mental Illness, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 79 (2010); Lindsay C. Malloy, Elizabeth P.
Shulman, & Elizabeth Cauffman, Interrogations, Confessions, and Guilty Pleas
Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 181 (2014).  The Na-
tional Registry of Exonerations notes that 15 percent of known exonerees pled
guilty. Innocents Who Plead Guilty, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Nov.
24, 2015),  https://bit.ly/3rsmfQO [https://perma.cc/89EG-MJZS].
15. Redlich et al., supra note 14, at 339; Samuel R. Gross, What We Think,
What We Know, and What We Think We Know About False Convictions, 14 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 753, 778 (2017).
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victs innocent individuals.16  Defendant risk factors identified in the
literature include youthfulness and a prior criminal record,17 and
additional risk factors—e.g., mental illness, cognitive and intellec-
tual disabilities, suggestibility—have been identified for false con-
fession, which in turn increases the risk of wrongful conviction.18
Wrongful convictions of factually innocent defendants differ from
cases in which a wrongful conviction was narrowly avoided in a
number of ways, such as intentional misidentification, forensic er-
rors, prosecutorial misconduct in withholding exculpatory evidence,
false testimony, and inadequate lawyering on the part of the de-
fense attorney.19  Although the main contributors to a wrongful
conviction appear to vary by case type, significant causes of convic-
tion of the innocent include mistaken eyewitness identification,
false accusations, false confessions, misleading forensic evidence,
and official misconduct.20
Although an extensive body of research and scholarship has
focused on wrongful convictions of factually innocent defendants,
only a small subset has included a robust analysis of two variables
strongly associated with wrongful conviction:  Youthfulness and mi-
noritized race.21  Commonly, research and scholarship on wrongful
16. Gould & Leo, supra note 8, at 838–58.
17. Jon B. Gould, Julia Carrano, Richard A. Leo & Katie Hail-Jares, Predict-
ing Erroneous Convictions, 99 IOWA L. REV. 471, 494–505 (2014).
18. See generally Saul M. Kassin, Steven A. Drizin, Thomas Grisso, Gisli H.
Gudjonsson, Richard A. Leo & Allison D. Redlich, Police-Induced Confessions:
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010).
19. Jon Gould & Richard A. Leo, The Path to Exoneration, 79 ALA. L. REV.
325, 335–36 (2015).
20. Gross, supra note 15, at 769–73.
21. Many books and articles have raised this issue and identified the critical
importance of race and of youthfulness. See, e.g., MARVIN D. FREE, JR. & MITCH
RUESINK, RACE & JUSTICE: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
MEN (2012); Earl Smith & Angela J. Hattery, Race, Wrongful Conviction & Exon-
eration, 15 J. AFRICAN AM. STUD. 74 (2011); Elizabeth Webster & Jody Miller,
Gendering and Racing Wrongful Conviction: Intersectionality, Normal Crimes, and
Women’s Experiences of Miscarriage of Justice, 78 ALA. L. REV. 973 (2014); SA-
MUEL R. GROSS, MAURICE POSSLEY, & KLARA STEPHENS, RACE AND WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2017); Patrick Webb, Dennis Savard, & Ai-
mee Delaney, The Color of Confinement: Examining Youth Exoneration Decisions
and the Critical Race Theory, 18 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 206; Allison D. Redlich,
The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 943 (2009); Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts
a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007).
However, that any articles on wrongful conviction or its contributors have been
published in the past 10 years without robust discussion of race and youthfulness
highlights the need for a framework for discussing and researching the impact of
minoritized racial status and adolescence in creating convictions of those who are
factually innocent.
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convictions and their causal factors, such as false confessions, pre-
sent a single narrative focused on system variables22 allegedly com-
mon to all defendants.  This approach thereby does not fully
examine that the way system involvement plays out for Black inno-
cent defendants may be profoundly different than for White inno-
cent defendants, or that age may also play a role.23  Although one
would not know it from much of the relevant literature, race pro-
foundly shapes the trajectory toward a wrongful conviction:  One
analysis concludes that a Black individual convicted of murder is 38
percent more likely to be innocent than a non-Black individual, an
individual convicted of sexual assault is 3.5 times more likely to be
innocent if he is Black than if he is White, and ten times as many
innocent Black people are convicted of drug crimes than are inno-
cent White people.24
22. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon & Stephen D. Penrod, Eyewitness
Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 45, 47–48 (2006).
The focus on system variables, or those things over which the system has control,
has often been to the exclusion of estimator variables, which include many of the
ways in which racial bias shapes wrongful convictions (e.g., racial dynamics of eye-
witness identification). Id.
23. See generally, e.g., Scherr et al., supra note 8 (a recent article presenting a
framework for thinking about the cumulative disadvantage of innocence com-
pounded at each stage of justice system processing, but mentioning only a single
time that the phenomena they identify may play out differently for defendants of
Color and identifying adolescence as a notable risk factor during interrogation and
pleas but describing a full discussion of youthfulness as beyond the scope of the
article); James R. Acker, Taking Stock of Innocence: Movements, Mountains, and
Wrongful Convictions, 33 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 8 (2017) (presenting an over-
view on extant knowledge regarding the innocence movement and discussing racial
bias in only three sentences and referencing youthfulness only once in a list of
factors associated with wrongful convictions as opposed to near misses); Kassin et
al., supra note 18 (providing a comprehensive overview of research on false confes-
sions in the form of a white paper and making no mention of race other than to
describe defendants in case vignettes, though discussing the risk of adolescence/
immaturity at length); Robert J. Norris, James R. Acker, Catherine L. Bonventre,
& Allison D. Redlich, Thirty Years of Innocence: Wrongful Convictions and Exon-
erations in the United States, 1989–2018, 1 WRONGFUL CONVICTION L. REV. 1 (re-
viewing research from 30 years of the innocence movement and discussing race as
a variable in need of further examination but not referencing age or youthfulness).
24. Gross, supra note 15, at 778–84.  Notably, because of limitations in the
way ethnicity data is recorded, these same figures cannot be clearly generated for
Latinx defendants.  Barbara O’Brien, Klara Stephens, Maurice Possley & Cathe-
rine M. Grosso, Latinx Defendants, False Convictions, and the Difficult Road to
Exoneration, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1682, 1706–14 (2019).  For a discussion of the par-
ticular vulnerabilities of Latinx defendants to wrongful conviction and the ways in
which they are disadvantaged in securing exoneration, see generally id.
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Youth are also at heightened risk of wrongful conviction.25
They face not only the same risks as adults (e.g., risk of wrongful
eyewitness identification or false testimony) but are appreciably at
greater risk than adults in some domains (youth are profoundly
over-represented in proven false confessions, for example).26  Addi-
tionally, youth face a number of structural disadvantages in the way
the legal system processes their cases that may lead to higher likeli-
hood that a wrongful conviction will not be caught and stopped
before it can happen,27 or may result in a youth being convicted or
adjudicated even though the relevant legal actors do not believe
they are guilty.28  These disadvantages are, at times, amplified by
features of the juvenile justice system for youth who are processed
as juveniles.29  For example, the quality of legal representation in
juvenile court may be especially poor or may not focus on zealously
advocating for the child’s rights,30 and lack of due process protec-
tions related to probable cause and to the right to a jury trial may
make youth in juvenile court especially vulnerable.31  Additionally,
the system does not devote resources to identifying wrongful adju-
dications in juvenile court, either because the penalties wrongfully
adjudicated juveniles face are less severe than those of individuals
wrongfully convicted in adult court,32 or because the focus on reha-
bilitation within juvenile court creates a less adversarial process
that does not prioritize appeals.33
Although each has a meaningful impact on system trajectory
on its own, youthfulness and racial bias do not just exist as separate
disadvantages.  They must be considered together to develop a ro-
bust understanding of how wrongful convictions of these youth are
created by decisions of a variety of legal actors throughout the
25. Gould et al., supra note 17, at 513–14; Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider
& Lynda M. Tricarico, Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 891–93 (2010).
26. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 259–60; SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL
SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012: REPORT BY THE
NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 60 (2012), https://bit.ly/2Qb3kvW [https:/
/perma.cc/U6P6-ATFA].  Of proven exoneration cases, 42 percent of cases involv-
ing a defendant under the age of 18 included a false confession, compared to 8
percent of cases of adults with no known mental disabilities. Id.
27. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 260.
28. See generally Victor Streib, Intentional Wrongful Conviction of Children,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2010).
29. Id. at 172–74; Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 260.
30. Streib, supra note 28, at 172– 74; Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at
289–92.
31. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 300–06.
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 296.
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court process.34  Given the profound impact of race and of youth-
fulness on convictions of those who are factually innocent, we argue
that no research or scholarship on wrongful convictions or their
contributing factors should present a conceptualization devoid of
discussion of age and race.  This Article is, in part, an attempt to
create a framework for thinking about the ways in which minori-
tized racial status—particularly being Black—and youthfulness in-
teract with each other and with innocence to produce wrongful
convictions.  In Section III, we present a preliminary, incomplete
analysis of the ways in which these variables may shape a defen-
dant’s experiences, both individually and when combined.  We hope
that this conceptualization may be part of a paradigm shift in the
fields of legal psychology and legal scholarship that complicates our
understanding of wrongful conviction by accounting for the realities
of those who are frequently wrongfully convicted:  Young, Black
men.35
B. Wrongful Conviction as Profound Miscarriage of Justice
Although research and scholarship on wrongful conviction tac-
itly agree on a shared definition of the term as a conviction of
someone who is factually innocent,36 this definition creates a focus
on only a small segment of the cases in which someone is adjudi-
34. See generally Webb, Savard & Delaney, supra note 21.  Although our con-
ceptualization of these disadvantages is heavily influenced by intersectional theory
on multiply marginalized identities and interactions between oppressions, we do
not use the term in this paper because of the ongoing debates about the appropri-
ate applications of intersectionality and because of popular misconceptions of the
meaning of the term. See Jennifer C. Nash, Re-Thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMI-
NIST REV. 1, 9–10 (2008); Sumi Cho, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw & Leslie Mc-
Call, Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis,
38 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 785, 787–92 (2013); Claudia Garcia-Rojas, Inter-
sectionality Is a Hot Topic—And So Is the Term’s Misuse, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 17,
2019), https://bit.ly/3tliIV5 [https://perma.cc/82GB-KDHU].
35. See generally Webb, Savard & Delaney, supra note 21.
36. There are a few notable exceptions.  For example, a 2010 article on wrong-
ful convictions of children defines wrongful convictions as “convicting a criminal
defendant or adjudicating a juvenile respondent for the offense charged without
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant or respondent may or may not
have actually committed the offense, but in all cases the proof offered by the state
failed to meet the required burden beyond a reasonable doubt, thus making the
conviction violate the Due Process clause.  Streib, supra note 28, at 163 n.1.  De-
spite individual attempts to reconceptualize wrongful conviction, however, the
dominant definition has not shifted across multiple decades of scholarship.  More
recently, some scholars have included partial innocence, that is, situations in which
someone confesses or pleads guilty to something they did not do although they
were factually guilty of some wrongdoing related to the allegations made against
them, within the definition of wrongful conviction. See, e.g., Tina M. Zottoli,
Tarika Daftary-Kapur, Georgia M. Winters & Conor Hogan, Plea Discounts, Time
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cated delinquent or convicted despite having not committed mean-
ingful wrongdoing.  Factual innocence is an incomplete focus given
who and what the American criminal and juvenile justice systems
choose to criminalize; if we are concerned with wrongful charging
and wrongful convictions or adjudications, factual innocence is a
faulty lens.  The astoundingly exponential expansion of criminaliza-
tion in the United States37 has specifically targeted Americans of
Color, particularly Black Americans.38  Criminal law has been ap-
plied to make poverty, mental illness, and homelessness punishable
offenses39 but has failed to hold accountable police who murder
Black Americans40 or corporate officers committing malfeasance
that destroys the livelihoods or lives of huge numbers.41  Addition-
ally, discretion built into the system—exercised by police officers,
prosecutors, and judges—ensures that not everyone who engages in
conduct that could be criminalized is, in fact, criminalized.42  This
uneven and inappropriate criminalization also has a profound im-
pact on youth; indeed, “much of youth crime and delinquency is the
product of normal adolescent development.”43  The law has increas-
ingly treated children as criminals for youthful behavior occurring
in schools44 and in the community45 and then processed them as
Pressures, and False-Guilty Pleas in Youth and Adults Who Plead Guilty to Felo-
nies in New York City, 22 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 250, 255–56 (2016).
37. The number of people incarcerated in the United States has quadrupled
since 1980, and the number of federal prisoners has increased tenfold. ANTHONY
B. BRADLEY, ENDING OVERCRIMINALIZATION AND MASS INCARCERATION: HOPE
FROM CIVIL SOCIETY 24–25 (2018).  When including probation and parole, 2.8 per-
cent of Americans are incarcerated within or supervised by the criminal justice
system. Id. at 23.
38. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCER-
ATION IN THE AGE OF COLOR BLINDNESS (2010).
39. See generally PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN AMERICA (2019) (discussing the ways in which
the law criminalizes behavior that is normative or unavoidable for people living in
poverty).
40. See generally Somil Trivedi & Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, To Serve and
Protect Each Other: How Police-Prosecutor Codependence Enables Police Miscon-
duct, 100 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2020) (describing the mechanisms through which po-
lice officer avoid accountability for serious misconduct, including murder).
41. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34
GA. STATE U. L. REV. 335, 336 (2018).
42. Henning, supra note 4, at 426–29.
43. Id. at 385.
44. For a discussion of the criminalization of children and adolescents in
school, see generally Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization
of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79 (2008).
45. See, e.g., VICTOR M. RIOS, HUMAN TARGETS: SCHOOLS, POLICE, AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF LATINO YOUTH (2017) (exploring Latino youths’ exper-
iences of criminalization within their communities).
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adults rather than as children.46  As Professor Kristin Henning ex-
plains, “The prevalence of minor, low-impact offenders in juvenile
courts today reflects society’s continued unwillingness to tolerate
‘normal’ adolescent misconduct—particularly among poor youth of
color.”47  Certainly, avoiding the profound harm done when an in-
nocent person is convicted is critical, but focusing on those cases to
the exclusion of the rest of those who are inappropriately criminal-
ized is problematic.
In a foundational article on the criminalization of normative
adolescent behavior, Henning provided a number of case examples
of youth charged with delinquency following “allegations that, if
true, meet the statutory elements for the crimes listed” but never-
theless should not result in justice system involvement:48
JAQUAN:  Several boys are sitting outside in a public park.  Ja-
quan, aged fifteen, finds marijuana in his older brother’s room and
brings it out to share with his friends.  All of the boys try it—each
one excited about the opportunity to experiment and afraid of ap-
pearing lame in front of his friends.  Police arrest all of the boys and
prosecutors charge each with possession of marijuana.  Prosecutors
also charge Jaquan with distribution.
JAMES:  Fifteen-year-old James is wearing a hoodie sweatshirt
in public, a violation of an obscure city ordinance prohibiting such
attire.  James mouths off at the police officer who tells him to take
it off.  The police officer arrests James.  Prosecutors charge James
with resisting a police officer for refusing to comply with the of-
ficer’s instructions.
ERIC, MARK, & DERRICK:  Fifteen-year-old Eric sees twelve-
year-old Robert standing in line at an ice cream truck.  Eric grabs
Robert’s money, throws it in the air, and runs away laughing.  Rob-
ert runs away in the opposite direction without picking up the
money.  Mark and Derrick, two other twelve-year-olds standing in
line at the ice cream truck, pick up the money from the ground and
pocket it.  Mark and Derrick are prosecuted in juvenile court for
taking property without right.  Prosecutors charge Eric with
robbery.
RODNEY & ROLAND:  Two African American boys, Rodney
and Roland, throw pebbles across the train tracks at a young His-
panic boy, José, for no reason other than they are bored and José is
46. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE,
POLITICS, & THE CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 105–55 (2017).
47. Henning, supra note 4, at 403–04.
48. Id. at 427.
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different.  Rodney and Roland, both aged fourteen, are charged in
juvenile court with assault with a dangerous weapon.
SHANNON:  Sixteen-year-old Shannon is riding a public bus
with five classmates from her special education school when she no-
tices one of the teacher’s aides from her school at the back of the
bus.  Shannon snatches the aide’s hat and tosses it to one of her
classmates.  After playing a game of catch with the hat through
peals of laughter, the children drop the hat and get off the bus.
Police arrest Shannon at school the next day.  Prosecutors charge
her with robbery.
JACOB:  For several weeks, two or three classmates verbally
tease Jacob, a chubby thirteen-year-old.  Jacob is visibly pained and
distraught by the verbal abuse. About two months into the school
year, a group of unknown youth approach Jacob as he is sitting
alone at a lunch table.  Unsure of their motives, but without any
physical provocation to justify a claim of self-defense, Jacob throws
a book, hitting one of the youth in the face and breaking his glasses.
Prosecutors charge Jacob with felony assault and destruction of
property.49
These offenses are a representative—though certainly not ex-
haustive—list of the types of adolescent behavior that may initiate a
serious justice system response although the behavior could well be
handled entirely outside of a justice system context.  These cases
will be familiar to anyone who has worked with youth within the
justice system, and we believe these impulsive adolescent behaviors
will be familiar to anyone who has spent time with teenagers or, at
one point, has been a teenager themselves.  What is different about
these instances, though, is that for these youth, normative youthful
behavior resulted in serious legal consequences and disrupted their
lives.
With this understanding, the case of Michael described in the
introduction is the same as the case of Huwe Burton; both are sto-
ries of a Black boy who was a typical teenager, engaged in no
wrongful conduct beyond what most adolescents do.  They both ex-
perienced justice system involvement, lost years of their lives to in-
carceration, and had their life trajectories profoundly reshaped
because of the unreasonable criminalization to which they were
subjected.  Both boys were youth who never should have been pul-
led into the justice system, but were.  They were both, under the
plain meaning of the words, wrongfully convicted.  We propose,
then, a redefinition of wrongful conviction to include more of the
49. Id.
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miscarriages of justice that could properly carry that label:  A
wrongful conviction is a conviction or adjudication for someone
who never should have been involved in the justice system in the
first place.
We propose a two-prong conceptualization of wrongful convic-
tion.  One type of wrongful conviction involves the conviction or
adjudication of someone who is factually innocent of the crime with
which they are charged; we refer to this as Type A.  The other type
of wrongful conviction involves the conviction or adjudication of
someone who has engaged in no wrongdoing worse than age-nor-
mative behavior, but nevertheless is adjudicated delinquent or con-
victed in criminal court; we refer to this as Type B.  This Article will
explore these two types of wrongful conviction, as well as wrongful
charging—that is, justice involvement (whether via charges in crim-
inal court or a delinquency petition filed in juvenile court) of one of
the above two types that ends short of a criminal conviction or a
delinquency adjudication.  In so doing, we focus specifically on
youth of Color in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.  We rec-
ognize that the second category of wrongful conviction we propose
may also extend to youth or adults whose poverty or mental illness
or homelessness or gender has been policed and criminalized, but
our focus is on wrongful charging and convictions emerging from
the criminalization of normative adolescent behavior.  The next sec-
tion contextualizes this focus.
II. A DEVELOPMENTALLY INFORMED FRAMEWORK FOR
EXPLORING RISK OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION—THE
IMPORTANCE OF AGE AND MINORITIZED RACE
The wrongful charging and conviction of youth in juvenile
courts—of both Type A and Type B—has received surprisingly little
attention given the vulnerabilities posed by adolescent develop-
ment and the closed nature of juvenile proceedings.50  A separate
juvenile justice system was originally developed in part as a re-
sponse to the recognition that adolescents are normatively different
from adults such that they are less culpable for their behavior and
more responsive to treatment.51  This recognition is what informs
the juvenile justice system’s theoretical prioritization of rehabilita-
tion, accountability, and confidentiality over the retributive prac-
50. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 265, 306–10.
51. For a history of the juvenile justice system, see generally FELD, supra note
46 (describing the evolution of the juvenile justice system from the emergence of
the first juvenile court through the present era).
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tices of the criminal justice system.52  Theoretically, the original
juvenile courts were meant to rehabilitate delinquent youth into
productive citizens, not punish them.53  However, the consequences
of being adjudicated delinquent are real and lasting.  Juvenile jus-
tice involvement is not insignificant; juvenile courts, though less pu-
nitive, do punish and confine youth, and initial system involvement
leads to future juvenile and criminal system involvement and is as-
sociated with a host of collateral consequences and stigma.54
A. Developmental Science and Youth Justice Involvement
Decades of developmental and neuroscience research under-
score the commonsense understanding that adolescents are differ-
ent from adults in ways that make adolescents prone to risky
behavior.  Adolescents are more likely than children and adults to
engage in risky behavior of all kinds, and some scholars have ar-
gued that involvement in law-breaking behavior is really just one
“instance of risk-taking more generally,” as adolescents are also
more likely to engage in risky sex, reckless driving, or self-inflicted
injury.55  Behavioral studies show that while youth, on average,
reach cognitive maturity by mid-adolescence, their judgment and
decision-making capacities continue to mature well beyond this
point.56  Even though older adolescents are able to identify risks
like adults, the way they value and respond to risk and reward is
different from adults in important ways that are relevant to under-
standing delinquent behavior.  For one, when adolescents are
around their peers or in otherwise emotionally salient or stressful
situations, they value or prioritize the immediate and positive con-
sequences of a potential decision.57  Although adults may find a ra-
52. Id.
53. Kristin Henning, The Challenge of Race and Crime in a Free Society: The
Racial Divide in 50 Years of Juvenile Justice Reform, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1604,
1623 (2018).  For an analysis of how the juvenile justice system was developed
specifically to rehabilitate White youth, to the exclusion of Black youth, see gener-
ally GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY AND JU-
VENILE JUSTICE (2012).
54. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings:
Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
520, 525–38 (2004).
55. Steinberg, supra note 7, at 515.
56. Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from
Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 55, 56 (2007).
Neural development—and the judgment and decision-making abilities that extend
from this neural development—extends into the early-to-mid-twenties. Id.
57. Philip David Zelazo & Stephanie M. Carlson, Hot and Cool Executive
Function in Childhood and Adolescence: Development and Plasticity, 6 CHILD
DEV. PERSPS. 354, 356 (2012); Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influ-
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tional decision to be one that maximizes benefits and minimizes
costs, adolescents are more likely to find a rational decision to be
one that maximizes the immediate, social, and emotional benefits,
regardless of the longer-term costs.  This aspect of youth decision
making is why adolescents, as a class, are more likely to make risky
decisions that are impulsive58—and that often occur in the presence
of their peers—even when they know the potential for negative
consequences.59  Therefore, Michael’s decision to steal a cell phone
when he was hanging out with his friends is not entirely surprising,
given what we know about adolescent behavior.
The increase in reckless behavior during adolescence correlates
with underlying brain development.  According to recent advances
in developmental neuroscience, risk taking and decision making
during adolescence is partially informed by the asymmetric devel-
opmental trajectories of two distinct systems in the brain:  the
socioemotional system, which is made up primarily of the limbic
areas of the brain, and the cognitive control system, which involves
the prefrontal cortex.60  According to this dual-systems theory,
scholars propose that a window of opportunity for risky decision
making emerges between the earlier development of the socioemo-
tional system and the later, more gradual developmental trajectory
of the cognitive control systems.61  Specifically, the limbic system,
which is sensitive to social and emotional rewards and stimuli, ma-
tures during puberty; this developmental change is believed to re-
sult in increases in sensation and reward seeking behavior during
early adolescence.62  The cognitive-control system, which is impli-
cated in executive functions such as planning ahead, self-regulation,
and impulse control, develops more gradually into young adult-
hood.63  This perspective can help explain why in emotionally sali-
ent situations or in the presence of peers—stimuli that are
ence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence
and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEV. PSYCH. 625, 629–32 (2005); Dus-
tin Albert, Jason Chein & Laurence Steinberg, The Teenage Brain: Peer Influences
on Adolescent Decision Making, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 114, 114–15
(2013).
58. See Steinberg, supra note 56, at 56.
59. Ashley R. Smith, Jason Chein & Laurence Steinbeg, Peers Increase Ado-
lescent Risk Taking Even When the Probabilities of Negative Outcomes Are
Known, 50 DEV. SCI. 1564, 1567–68 (2014).
60. Steinberg, supra note 56, at 56.
61. Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52
DEV. PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 216 (2010).
62. Id.
63. Id.; Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult: Assessing
Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCH. SCI. 549,
560 (2016).
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particularly activating to the socioemotional system—adolescents
are less likely to think ahead, consider the long-term consequences
of their actions, or self-regulate.64  Adult-like decision making in
stressful and emotional contexts is thought to rely on both of these
mature systems such that even under highly emotional circum-
stances, adults have the capacity to exhibit greater impulse control
than children or adolescents.65  Although some adults are primed to
engage in risky and reckless behavior, on average, adolescents are
more vulnerable to this type of decision making due to the in-
creased sensitivity to rewards and ongoing development of the
prefrontal cortices implicated in executive functions.
Many of the same developmental features of adolescence that
result in criminal or delinquent charging of normative adolescent
behavior leave youth vulnerable to pressures that increase risks of
wrongful conviction.  Innocent suspects ascribe to a naı̈ve sense that
justice will prevail, the truth will set them free, and therefore, will
waive their Miranda rights during interrogation and speak to po-
lice.66  As we describe later, youth are more likely than adults to
waive these rights67 in part because they not only naively believe
that justice will prevail but also because they are more likely than
adults to give in to the pressures of authority figures,68 to prioritize
immediate outcomes such as putting an end to an aversive interro-
gation process,69 or to protect their friends.70  Interrogators are
often more confrontational with innocent suspects who attempt to
deny involvement and maintain their innocence.71  These practices
are difficult for even adults to resist,72 and adolescents’ susceptibil-
ity to the influence of authority figures places youth at even greater
64. See generally Alexandra O. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Jus-
tice: The Intersection of Developmental Neuroscience & Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 63 (2014).
65. See Steinberg, supra note 56, at 56.
66. Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCH. 215, 218–19 (2005).
67. Infra Section III.B.
68. Thomas Grisso, Laurence Steinberg, Jennifer Woolard, Elizabeth
Cauffman, Elizabeth Scott, Sandra Graham, Fran Lexcen, N. Dickon Reppucci &
Robert Schwartz, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adoles-
cents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 353
(2003).
69. Malloy et al., supra note 14, at 185–87.
70. Id.
71. Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral
Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 187, 197–98 (2003).
72. Kassin, supra note 66, at 219–20.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 20 24-MAY-21 10:09
672 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:653
risk of giving into this interrogative pressure.73  It also makes it
more likely that adolescents acquiesce to attorney recommenda-
tions even if they disagree with what the attorney recommends.74
Adolescents may be more likely than adults to feel pressured to go
along with attorney recommendations to plead guilty75 and less
likely to speak up when they disagree.  A robust literature has high-
lighted the cumulative disadvantage of innocence;76 developmental
science tells us that this cumulative disadvantage is greater for inno-
cent or wrongfully charged youth.
B. Youth Vulnerability from Racial Bias
Developmental maturity and the corresponding vulnerability
to systemic pressures do not exist in a racial vacuum.  Adding to the
developmental vulnerability of youth, the experiences of youth of
Color make them particularly vulnerable to the pressure of author-
ity figures, especially those in law enforcement.77  Racial disparities
in legal system involvement can be seen even among the youngest
youth.  A recent review of cases in California revealed Black youth
as young as 5 to 11 years old are disproportionately impacted by the
legal system and that the overrepresentation of Black youth in-
creases with each stage of justice system contact.78  The juvenile
and criminal legal systems have consistently treated youth of Color
more harshly than White youth and scholars have argued that this is
“in part because decision makers throughout the system are less
inclined to recognize their developmental immaturity.”79  In fact,
research has shown that both the public and police officers overesti-
mate the age of young Black felony defendants by an average of
four years, which often means that Black youth are inaccurately
perceived as adults.80  These errors are not due to legal factors such
as crime severity but are instead the result of racial bias and associ-
73. Infra Section III.B.
74. Jodi L. Viljoen, Jessica Klaver & Ronald Roesch, Legal Decisions of
Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Com-
munication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 268 (2005).
75. See Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 357.
76. For a review, see Scherr et al., supra note 8.
77. Kristin Henning, The Reasonable Black Child: Race, Adolescence, and the
Fourth Amendment, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1513, 1529–33 (2018).
78. Laura S. Abrams, Matthew L. Mizel & Elizabeth S. Barnert, The
Criminalization of Young Children and Overrepresentation of Black Youth in the
Juvenile Justice System, 13 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 73, 78, 81 (2021).
79. Henning, supra note 4, at 387.
80. Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison Lewis Di
Leone, Carmen Marie Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Inno-
cence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 530–35 (2014).
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ated with implicit dehumanization of Black youth.  White youth are
not subjected to these mistakes; police officers perceive White
youth suspects as significantly younger than Black youth suspects,
and in fact perceive White youth suspected of a felony as younger
than their actual age.81
The disparate treatment of youth of Color is not a symptom of
a modern legal system but rather a consequence of its original de-
sign.82  The original juvenile courts were meant to assimilate or re-
habilitate the influx of European immigrants who were determined
delinquent or in need of intervention.83  However, these citizen-
building efforts were reserved for non-Black youth.84  Segregation-
ist policies denied rehabilitative services for Black youth.85  While
White youth were provided education and skills training, Black
youth were “trained to meet the agricultural and other manual la-
bor needs of the day.”86  The racial disparities inherent in our sys-
tem today are unsurprising given that the system was built on racist
policies and practices that ensured the mistreatment of youth of
Color.87  We do not have to look very far to see evidence of our
society’s continued refusal to recognize the developmental imma-
turity of youth of Color.  In the 1990s, the coded language warning
of the imminent rise of the superpredator led to swift racialized pol-
icy reforms that led to a dramatic increase in the number of young
Black boys tried as adults,88 a practice that continues today.  This
disparate treatment is more evident than ever before given how
often police killings of Black youth such as Tamir Rice, Antwon
Rose, Michael Brown, Frederick Cox, Cameron Tillman, and others
force into focus legal actors’ racist treatment of Black youth.  Black
youth are therefore doubly vulnerable to being unjustly involved
and harmed by the legal system.
Scholars have warned that the confidential nature of juvenile
court, though having important benefits and protecting youth from
public scrutiny, makes it incredibly difficult to explore wrongful
charging and convictions.89  The vulnerabilities that exist for inno-
81. Id.
82. For the definitive history of youth justice focused on the ways in which
racial conceptualizations shaped the development of juvenile justice practices, see
generally WARD, supra note 53.
83. Henning, supra note 53.
84. WARD, supra note 53, at 48–76.
85. Id.
86. Henning, supra note 53, at 1616.
87. WARD, supra note 53.
88. Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of
the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 379, 411–12 (2017).
89. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 273.
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cent adults are greater for youth.  Developmental immaturity puts
adolescents at risk for engaging in risky and reckless behavior, cav-
ing to pressure from authority figures like police and attorneys, and
making impulsive and shortsighted decisions that could have impor-
tant legal consequences.  Further, the still-developing nature of ad-
olescents’ cognitive and reasoning skills results in them
understanding less about their rights, interrogation practices, court
processes, and potential consequences and puts them at risk for
wrongful convictions—of both types.  Beyond developmental im-
maturity, race also places youth at risk for disparate treatment;
youth of Color are more likely to be suspected of criminal behavior,
more likely to have their behavior criminalized, and more likely to
be punitively punished than White youth.  Understanding how
these demographic variables shape a youth’s trajectory through the
justice system is necessary to fully conceptualize how wrongful con-
victions are created.
III. THE CUMULATIVE DISADVANTAGE OF YOUTHFULNESS AND
RACIAL BIAS IN CREATING WRONGFUL OUTCOMES
FROM JUSTICE SYSTEM PROCESSING
In this section, we explore the complex impacts of youthful-
ness, minoritized racial identity, and the intersection of the two on
each stage of justice processing for youth who have been wrongfully
caught up in the system.  Although we primarily discuss the impacts
on justice processing generally, we specifically delineate ways in
which the adult or juvenile systems particularly disadvantage youth,
when relevant.  There are numerous ways to conceptualize the
stages of processing.  For this paper, we have delineated the process
into eight stages based on the extant literature we present:  Initial
police contact, police investigations, charging, pre-trial detention,
plea bargains, trial or adjudicatory hearing, sentencing or disposi-
tion, and post-disposition including termination of supervision or
incarceration, appeals, and long-term collateral consequences of
justice involvement.  Disadvantages experienced in any one stage,
from youthful status or racial bias or both, often continue to impact
youth into future stages, compounding the likelihood of an adverse
outcome at each step.
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A. Initial Police Contact
For most youth, entanglement with the justice system begins
with an encounter with law enforcement.90  Therefore, policing
practices profoundly shape whether—and how—a youth will be
charged with a crime or have a delinquency petition filed.  Law en-
forcement policies dictate which communities are surveilled, which
youth are suspected of illegal activity, and which youth are ar-
rested.91  A police officer’s decision to intervene in a youth’s life,
then, is the first step in wrongfully convicting a youth.  As discussed
above, this intervention may occur when police choose to investi-
gate a youth who is factually innocent of illegal or delinquent be-
havior, or when police choose to respond to typical adolescent
behavior in a way that leads to justice involvement.92  As we discuss
further in future sections, this initial policing decision has far-reach-
ing implications in shaping the trajectory of a youth’s life well be-
yond the law enforcement encounter.
Status offenses, or conduct that is illegal only because of legal
status as a minor,93 by definition pull youth into the justice system
for normative adolescent rule-breaking or boundary testing.  Be-
cause these behaviors are not wrongful or problematic other than
because a youth is involved, criminalizing them fails to “take into
account the normal experimentation of childhood and adoles-
cence.”94  Every year, nearly 100,000 youth have a status offense
petition filed against them, thereby bringing the youth into contact
with the justice system, and the system ultimately adjudicates the
youth as a status offender in more than a third of those cases.95
Although youth engaged in status offending may be in need of ser-
90. COMM. ON ASSESSING JUV. JUST. REFORM, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A
Developmental Approach 49 (2013).
91. Tony A. Barringer & Belinda E. Bruster, The Juvenile Justice System: An
Analysis of Discretion and Minority Overrepresentation, in 1 COLOR BEHIND BARS:
RACISM IN THE US PRISON SYSTEM 191, 194–98 (Scott William Bowman ed., 2014).
92. See supra Section I.B; Henning, supra note 77, at 1529–38.
93. Status offenses include truancy, curfew violations, running away, alcohol
consumption, and ungovernability or incorrigibility.  Zachary Auspitz, Juvenile Sta-
tus Offenses: The Prejudicial Underpinnings of the Juvenile Justice System, 8 U.
MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018).
94. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, STATUS OFFENDERS LITERA-
TURE REVIEW: A PRODUCT OF THE MODEL PROGRAMS GUIDE 1 (2015), https://
bit.ly/2Qd8h7F [https://perma.cc/D5WB-TM9K].  “Children and adolescents com-
monly experiment with behaviors that are not considered positive or prosocial,
such as lying, being truant, or defying parents.  Such experimentation allows
youths to discover the negative consequences of their behaviors and learn from
their mistakes.” Id.
95. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, JUVENILE COURT
STATISTICS 2018, 63–79 (2020), https://bit.ly/2P0O3NT [https://perma.cc/TSD5-
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vices, those services do not require police or justice system con-
tact.96  The justice system continues to detain or place youth in
residential care because of status offending, as many as 40,000 per
year.97
Police enter encounters with adolescents ill-equipped to under-
stand or respond effectively to youths’ developmental needs; in
most states, less than one percent of officer training time is spent on
information specific to youth.98  However, almost a third of police
use-of-force incidents involve 16–19-year-olds—despite youth these
ages making up only 3.5 percent of police contacts generally.99
Thus, officers appear to have a uniquely challenging time safely and
effectively navigating contacts with adolescents.  Developmentally,
adolescents are primed to act impulsively, to have strong emotional
responses to situations, to assert independence, and to choose be-
haviors that feel good in the moment despite potential serious long-
term consequences.100  In encounters with police, this may translate
to adolescents challenging police authority—especially when police
have treated the youth or others in their community unfairly in the
past101—in ways that are developmentally appropriate but that may
lead to arrest and/or police use-of-force.102  Indeed, police may be
especially likely to arrest youth for “contempt of cop,” or behaving
in a way that police find disrespectful or offensive despite the ab-
7J9K].  A substantial portion of these cases are referred by law enforcement (17
percent in 2018), and a large portion are referred by schools. Id. at 76.
96. See, e.g., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 94, at 7.
97. Jay D. Blitzman, Are We Criminalizing Adolescence?, 30 CRIM. JUST. 22,
25 (2015).  Notably, incarcerating status offenders violates at least the spirit of the
law, if not the letter of the law, as juvenile justice system funding from the federal
government to the states requires deinstitutionalization of status offenders.  Emily
Haney-Caron & Erika Diaz Ortiz, Legal Update: The Reauthorization of the Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, AM. PSYCH.-L. SOC’Y NEWSL. (John
Jay Coll. of Crim. Just.), Feb. 2019, at 1–2, https://bit.ly/3eITa01 [ https://perma.cc/
2GAM-YH9T].
98. STRATEGIES FOR YOUTH, IF NOT NOW, WHEN? A SURVEY OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE TRAINING IN AMERICA’S POLICE ACADEMIES 4 (2013), https://bit.ly/
3qJ2Qtz [https://perma.cc/X45T-8V3M].  Five states report requiring no training
for officers on juvenile justice specific issues, and only two states include training
adolescent development specifically. Id.
99. Id. at 8.
100. See supra Section II.A.
101. Perceptions of police legitimacy are associated with compliance with po-
lice, especially for youth.  Glenn D. Walters & P. Colin Bolger, Procedural Justice
Perceptions, Legitimacy Beliefs, & Compliance with the Law: A Meta-Analysis, 15
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 341, 347 (2019).
102. See generally, e.g., Jeff Q. Bostic, Lisa Thurau, Mona Potter & Stacy S.
Drury, Policing the Teen Brain, 53 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIA-
TRY 127 (2014).
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sence of dangerous or illegal conduct.103  Notably, the youth who
have developed the least self-control are more likely to have police
contact, and those contacts are more likely to involve police hostil-
ity than the contacts of youth who have developed greater self-reg-
ulation skills.104  Youthfulness, then, and the attendant
developmental immaturity, are unique risk factors for wrongfully
being pulled into the justice system—that is, for conduct that is
noncriminal, creating the first step toward a Type B wrongful
conviction.
Although youthfulness itself functions as a risk factor for
wrongful arrest—and, therefore, a potential wrongful adjudica-
tion—youthfulness intersects with race to create an especially high
vulnerability of wrongful arrest for youth of Color.  Black youth
have significantly lower perceptions of police legitimacy than White
youth, and this difference emerges in adolescence as Black youth
experience negative interactions with police.105  Black youth make
up 17 percent of the youth population but 31 percent of juvenile
arrests.106  Accounting for contextual and behavioral factors, Black
young adults are seven times more likely to be arrested than White
young adults.107  After initial contact, police use their discretion to
remove White youth from formal justice system processing, but do
not do so for youth of Color.108  Police exercise discretion in prob-
103. See generally Christy E. Lopez, Disorderly (mis)Conduct: The Problem
with Contempt of Cop Arrests, 4 ADVANCE 71 (2010), for a discussion of the phe-
nomenon of “contempt of cop” arrests made on charges such as disorderly con-
duct, resisting arrest, disturbing the peace, and obstructing a police officer.  Such
arrests may also be initiated following inappropriate officer use-of-force, to retro-
actively attempt to justify problematic police conduct. Id. at 76.  For a discussion
of “contempt of cop” charges of youth, specifically, see Bostic et al. supra note 102,
at 127.
104. Dylan B. Jackson, Alexander Testa & Michael G. Vaughn, Low Self-
Control and the Adolescent Police Stop: Intrusiveness, Emotional Response, and
Psychological Well-Being, 66 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 6–7 (2020).  Importantly, youth low
in self-control also experience the most significant harmful impacts stemming from
police stops, including social stigma and post-traumatic stress. Id. at 8.
105. Adam D. Fine, Kathleen E. Padilla & Kelsey E. Tom, Police Legitimacy:
Identifying Developmental Trends & Whether Youths’ Perceptions Can Be
Changed, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7–10 (2020).
106. Lisa Chiu, After Decades of Spending, Minority Youth Still Over-
represented in System, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://bit.ly/
3lhr6BO [https://perma.cc/JF2A-VZRR].
107. Cydney Schleiden, Kristy L. Soloski, Kaitlyn Milstead & Abby
Rhynehart, Racial Disparities in Arrests: A Race Specific Model Explaining Arrest
Rates Across Black & White Young Adults, 37 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK
J. 1, 7–11 (2019).
108. Rebecca D. Ericson & Deborah A. Eckberg, Racial Disparity in Juvenile
Diversion: The Impact of Focal Concerns & Organizational Coupling, 6 RACE &
JUST. 35, 45–46 (2016).  In some jurisdictions, almost two-thirds of White youth
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lematic ways even for more minor charges:  Data show disparities in
post-arrest case handling for Hispanic and racial minority youth,
such that police are more likely to refer these youth to the courts
than White youth.109  This may be, at least in part, because police
hold unconscious biases that Black youth are more likely to recidi-
vate, more culpable, and have more negative traits.110
Youth of Color experience police presence and contact in their
daily lives, even when they have no history of delinquency, and
often beginning at very young ages.111  Urban Black boys report
experiencing police harassment at extremely high levels, even if
they have never engaged in delinquent behavior, and both Black
boys and girls report knowing people who the police have
harassed.112  Justice-involved boys describe an often predominantly
White police force giving many chances to White youth (giving just
a verbal warning when an arrest could be made) but only rarely
extending these chances to youth of Color.113  Despite the dispari-
ties present in policing, police training generally does not include
information about disproportionate minority involvement of youth
eligible for police diversion are in fact diverted, compared to approximately one-
third of non-White youth eligible for diversion. Id.
109. Ronald E. Claus, Sarah Vidal & Michele Harmon, Racial and Ethnic Dis-
parities in the Police Handling of Juvenile Arrests, 64 CRIME & DELINQ. 1375,
1386–87 (2017).
110. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereo-
types About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 492–93 (2004).  Of-
ficers who were primed with words associated with Black reported worse
perceptions of a youth in a vignette even when the youth’s race was not specified,
and this effect was not attributable to explicit biases. Id.
111. See generally Ana Lilia Campos-Manzo, Marisol Flores, Denise Perez,
Zoe Halpert & Kevin Zevallos, Unjustified: Youth of Color Navigating Police Pres-
ence Across Sociospatial Environments, 10 RACE & JUST. 297 (2020).  One of the
reasons youth of Color experience such high levels of police contact is the prolifer-
ation of police in schools, creating schools that “run more like a prison than a high
school.”  Hirschfield, supra note 44, at 79.  Coupled with racial biases among
school personnel, Black youth, in particular, are pushed from schools and toward
justice involvement when school disciplinary issues receive a police response. Id.
at 92; Lauren A. Maddox, His Wrists Were Too Small: School Resource Officers
and the Over-Criminalization of America’s Students, 6 U. MIA. RACE & SOC. JUST.
L. REV. 193, 195–206 (2015–2016).
112. Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The
Experience of African American Youths, 20 GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 528–39 (2006).
In this qualitative study, youth reported police are disrespectful to them, treat
Black people like they “are worthless,” search youth to try to identify a ground for
arrest, and refuse to view Black youth (even those for whom the police cannot
identify an arrestable offense) as innocent.  Many youth also reported that family
or friends had been victims of police violence. Id. at 539–45.
113. Rachel Feinstein, A Qualitative Analysis of Police Interactions and Dis-
proportionate Minority Contact, 13 J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST. 159, 170–71 (2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 27 24-MAY-21 10:09
2021] YOUNG, BLACK, AND WRONGFULLY CHARGED 679
in the justice system.114  When Black youth experience these inter-
actions with police, either as a suspect or as a bystander, they come
to see police interactions as fueled by racism and experience a sense
of degradation, and these interactions become commonplace before
youth have the developmental maturity to effectively respond or
process what is happening to them.115  In adolescence, youth are
developing their own perceptions of the law and of justice.116
When youth experience the law—and law enforcement—as fair,
consistent, and just, they view the legal system as more legitimate
and are more likely to comply with the law.117  Alternatively, when
youth experience police contact that they perceive as illegitimate,
unfair, or unjust, the respect they hold for the law reduces, and so
does their future compliance.118  Being stopped by the police then,
in turn, increases future delinquency for Black and Latinx youth,
partially driven by the psychological distress youth experience fol-
lowing such a troubling encounter.119  Rather than what one might
expect, that delinquency triggers policing, the reverse is true:  Polic-
ing happens to youth of Color regardless of delinquency, and that
policing then creates delinquency among youth, which is then po-
liced.120  A wrongful arrest, one that results from unreasonably
criminalized conduct despite the absence of genuinely criminal con-
duct and which may or may not trigger a subsequent Type B wrong-
ful adjudication, ultimately leads to future justice involvement that
is not wrongful.  The system then creates justification for the in-
volvement of the youth within it, because once a youth has been
criminalized, the youth then acquiesces by becoming criminal.  No-
tably, the average age for first false admission—either a false con-
114. STRATEGIES FOR YOUTH, supra note 98, at 18.
115. See Nikki Jones, “The Regular Routine”: Proactive Policing and Adoles-
cent Development Among Young, Poor Black Men, 143 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEV. 33, 39–48 (2014).
116. Henning, supra note 53, at 1633–36.
117. Id. “Because adolescence is a critical time during which youth form their
own beliefs and norms about the law and legal institutions, youths’ perceptions of
fairness and justice during adolescence may have a substantial impact on their will-
ingness to obey the law as they transition into adulthood.” Id. at 1634.
118. See id.
119. Juan Del Toro et al., The Criminogenic and Psychological Effects of Po-
lice Stops on Adolescent Black & Latino Boys, 116 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS. 8261, 8266 (2018).  This longitudinal study found that law-abiding behavior
did not predict fewer police stops in the future; that is, boys could not avoid en-
counters with police by avoiding delinquency. See id. at 8267.
120. Id. at 8267.  This impact is greatest when the first police contact happens
at a younger age; that is, race and youthfulness interact to create an especially
harmful impact on young boys of Color. See id.
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fession or a false guilty plea—is 14.2 by youth self-report.121
Therefore, the possibility that a youth’s first system contact is
wrongful, due to unreasonable criminalization or factual innocence
or both, is uncomfortably high.
The first, wrongful, arrest leads to the next arrest, pushing a
youth further into the justice system.  Controlling for self-reported
offending, youth who are involved with the justice system are more
likely to be arrested than youth who had avoided prior justice sys-
tem involvement.122  Even for youth who manage to overcome this
push into delinquency, system contact continues:  Black youth re-
port less offending prior to first arrest than White youth, and once
they are arrested, Black youth are more likely than White youth to
be rearrested, controlling for offending following the first arrest.123
Police exercise discretion in choosing whether to formally book a
youth they detain, issue a citation, or issue an informal warning, and
once a youth has been formally booked, police are much more
likely to formally book that youth again in the future.124  Notably,
the decision to formally book is profoundly disparate for Black and
Hispanic youth compared to White youth, such that differential
booking rates by race account for a substantial portion of the dis-
parity in juvenile arrest history between youth of Color and White
youth.125  Policing sets off a cascade of consequences for a youth
that make youthfulness and racial minority status contributors to
wrongful system involvement, both for youth who are factually in-
nocent of the conduct with which they are charged (Type A), and
for youth who are factually guilty of criminalized typical adolescent
behavior (Type B).  The impact from initial policing then extends
into the next stage, police investigations.
121. Malloy et al., supra note 14, at 186.  More than a third (35.2 percent) of
justice-involved youth indicate they have given a false admission at least once. Id.
122. Jordan Beardslee et al., Under the Radar or Under Arrest: How Is Ado-
lescent Boys’ First Contact with the Juvenile Justice System Related to Future Of-
fending and Arrests? 43 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 342, 348–351 (2019).
123. Namita Tanya Padgaonkar et al., Exploring Disproportionate Minority
Contact in the Juvenile Justice System Over the Year Following First Arrest, J.
RSCH. ON ADOLESCENCE 1, 6–7 (2020).
124. See Steven Raphael & Sandra V. Rozo, Racial Disparities in the Acquisi-
tion of Juvenile Arrest Records, 37 J. LABOR ECON. S125, SS132–33 (2019). Youth
explain that a police officer “‘seeing them before’ or knowing of them as ‘trouble
makers,’ influences the police’s decision to stop them ‘for the littlest reasons.’”
Feinstein, supra note 113, at 168.  Thus, “[w]ithin the juvenile justice system, racial
subordination is maintained in part by an increased likelihood that youth of color
will be repeatedly arrested and will continue to cycle in and out of the justice
system, reducing their access to mainstream education and institutions.” Id.
125. See id. at 168–73.
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B. Police Investigations
As described in detail above,126 youth often become involved
in the justice system because of criminalization of normative ado-
lescent behavior.  However, youth are also at high risk for a Type A
wrongful adjudication when police incorrectly target them for
others’ serious criminal behavior.127  This incorrect targeting hap-
pens when police initiate an investigation after a report of a crime
and identify a youth as a suspect even though the youth was not
involved in the crime.  These two processes may reinforce each
other; as noted above, youth who have prior police contact are at
heightened risk of future police contact, regardless of their behav-
ior,128 and deciding to arrest someone increases an officer’s percep-
tion of that person’s guilt.129  Therefore, youth who have been
wrongfully caught up in the justice system for normative adolescent
conduct may, once they are known to police and have arrest
records, be more likely to be identified as suspects when genuinely
criminal conduct is committed by an unknown person in the future.
Regardless of previous justice involvement, however, once police
suspect a youth of serious criminal conduct that the youth did not
actually commit, youthfulness increases the risk that they will be
wrongfully prosecuted through a number of mechanisms.  This risk
is highest for Black youth; although African Americans make up 13
percent of the United States population, they make up almost half
of proven exoneration cases, and racial bias in selecting suspects
plays a role in this differential.130
1. Becoming a Suspect
Youth who may have some knowledge of a crime may be at
increased risk of becoming a suspect compared to adults because of
their difficulty effectively navigating a pre-custodial interview.131
126. See supra Section I.B.
127. Youth may be wrongfully convicted of serious crime at disproportion-
ately high rates compared to their level of justice involvement overall. See supra
notes 25–33 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
129. Moa Liden, Minna Grans & Peter Juslin, The Presumption of Guilt in
Suspect Interrogations: Apprehension as a Trigger of Confirmation Bias and
Debiasing Techniques, 42 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 336, 342–344 (2018).  In a vignette-
based study, Swedish police officers who themselves made the decision to arrest a
suspect selected more guilt-presumptive questions during interrogation and rated
the suspect as less trustworthy than when the suspect was not arrested. See id.
130. See GROSS ET AL., supra note 21, at 9–10.
131. A popular police training manual distinguishes between interviews,
which are designed to gather information, and interrogations, which are accusatory
and designed to gather proof of guilt, including confessions. See FRED E. INBAU,
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Although there is no research that directly examines youth presen-
tation in police interviews, in contrast to interrogation, research on
adolescent development132 and on youth misperceptions of police
and legal processes133 suggests that many youth are likely more na-
ive during police interviews than are most adults.134  Police are
trained to establish strong rapport during a nonaccusatory interview
so that the suspect comes to “trust the investigator’s objectivity and
sincerity,”135 which may be even more persuasive with children and
adolescents than with adults.  If factually innocent youth do not re-
alize an investigator’s true role and intentions—and the risk of be-
coming a suspect—they may fail to carefully monitor their
responses to avoid saying or doing anything the officer may deem
suspicious.  Police investigators, though, are trained to be suspicious
of someone they are interviewing when that person behaves in ways
that may be normative for adolescents, including:  Providing less
detail than the officer believes is appropriate in response to ques-
tions, not reporting their thoughts or emotions as part of a narrative
of a distressing event, using present verb tense when describing an
event in the past, providing unrealistic hypotheses about what may
have occurred, pausing before answering a question, not making
eye contact, or even slouching, or crossing their arms.136  Research-
ers in this area have noted that adolescents are generally more
likely than adults to demonstrate these kinds of behaviors, even
when not engaging in deception.137  Without the necessary training
on typical adolescent behavior, police may come to suspect a youth
JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TIONS AND CONFESSIONS 3–6 (2013).  Police interrogators are trained to use inter-
views to gather information and observe behavioral cues that may then lead them
to identify the person interviewed as a suspect, at which point questioning may
switch to a guilt-presumptive interrogation. See id.
132. See supra Section II.A.
133. As further described below, children and adolescents have poor under-
standing of their rights in police encounters and in legal contexts generally, often
do not appreciate police motivations, and are overly deferential to authority, in-
cluding police officers.  Naomi E.S. Goldstein, Emily Haney-Caron, Marsha
Levick & Danielle Whiteman, Waving Good-Bye to Waiver: A Developmental Ar-
gument against Youths’ Waiver of Miranda Rights, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 24–44 (2018).
134. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 274.  Youth are more likely than
adults to view police as friendly, suggesting they “do not fully grasp that an interro-
gating officer’s interests may be adverse to their own.”  Goldstein et al., supra note
133, at 38.
135. INBAU ET AL., supra note 131, at 6.
136. See id. at 89–135.
137. See Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Per-
ceptions Regarding Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 757, 762–63 (2007).
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of criminal wrongdoing simply because that youth behaves in age-
appropriate ways.
The likelihood that an interview will turn into an interrogation
may be especially high when police are interrogating youth of
Color, as these youth may respond to police differently because of
the stereotype threat they are experiencing.138  Stereotype threat is
“the apprehension one experiences when at risk of being perceived
in light of a negative stereotype that applies to one’s group”; during
a police interview, Black interviewees may be aware of stereotypes
related to Black criminality and dishonesty and may experience
pressure to appear both innocent and credible.139  Paradoxically,
the anxiety, emotional arousal, and efforts at impression manage-
ment triggered by stereotype threat may lead Black interviewees to
act in ways that police view as suspicious, such as making less eye
contact or increased hand movements.140  Najdowski explains that
“monitoring a situation for evidence of threat and controlling one’s
behavior to offset threat each require cognitive effort”141 and, given
that adolescents are still developing the executive functioning skills
necessary for self-monitoring,142 this cognitive load may be even
greater for youth interviewees, making them appear disengaged.
This phenomenon may also combine with police racial biases that
lead them to find youth of Color more suspicious than White
youth,143 such that the vulnerability of youthfulness at this stage is
compounded for youth of Color.  Whatever the contributing factors
in a specific case, once a youth becomes a suspect, their youthful-
ness creates a serious disadvantage by increasing the likelihood of
two of the most common types of evidence leading to a Type A
138. See generally Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in Criminal Inter-
rogations: Why Innocent Black Suspects Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely, 17
PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 562 (2011).  African American adolescent boys, for ex-
ample, are acutely aware of police racial biases and how those biases shape police
decision making. See generally Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t Like Black Peo-
ple”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMI-
NOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2007); Cynthia J. Najdowski, Bette L. Bottoms &
Phillip Atiba Goff, Stereotype Threat & Racial Differences in Citizens’ Experiences
of Police Encounters, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 463 (2015).
139. Najdowski, supra note 138, at 565–70.
140. Id. at 570–78; Deborah Davis & Richard A. Leo, Interrogation-Related
Regulatory Decline: Ego Depletion, Failures of Self-Regulation, & the Decision to
Confess, 18 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 673, 688–90 (2012).
141. Najdowski, supra note 138 at 570.
142. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Keisha April, Lindsey M. Cole & Naomi E. S. Goldstein, Police
Endorsement of Color-Blind Racial Beliefs and Propensity to Interact with Youth of
Color, 37 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 681, 687–90 (2019); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn &
Karin D. Martin, Policing and Race: Disparate Treatment, Perceptions, and Policy
Responses, 10 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 82, 89–97 (2016).
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wrongful conviction:  Unreliable witness statements and false
confessions.144
2. False Identifications
Although data are not available directly on this point, youth
may be more likely to be falsely implicated than are adults, because
children and adolescents who observe or are otherwise questioned
about a crime often implicate other children or adolescents.145  A
false implication may happen in a variety of ways.  First, child and
adolescent witnesses are more likely than adults to incorrectly iden-
tify a culprit when a lineup does not, in fact, include the true perpe-
trator, and also more likely to choose the wrong person even when
the true culprit is present in the lineup.146  If, as relevant scholar-
ship has postulated,147 children and adolescents are more likely to
be present when crimes are committed by other children and ado-
lescents, youth are at increased risk of being wrongfully charged
because of the possibility of an incorrect identification by a witness
or victim.  Second, children and adolescents may be implicated by
other youth who are themselves suspects.  That is, because of
youthful vulnerability to police interrogation tactics, described be-
low, youth may be pressured into telling police that another youth
was involved in committing the crime with them, even when that is
not true.148  Of 103 proven exonerations of youth, another youth’s
unreliable statement implicating the exoneree contributed to the
wrongful conviction in 34.9 percent of cases.149  This risk may be
especially strong for Black youth, given research showing that
Black men with stereotypical facial features are at greater risk of a
wrongful eyewitness identification.150
144. See generally Clanitra Stewart Nejdl & Karl Pettitt, Wrongful Convic-
tions and Their Causes: An Annotated Bibliography, 37 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 401
(2017) (describing five major causes of wrongful convictions).
145. Tepfer et al., supra note 25, at 893–94.
146. Ryan J. Fitzgerald & Heather L. Price, Eyewitness Identification Across
the Life Span: A Meta-Analysis of Age Differences, 141 PSYCH. BULL. 1228, 1230
(2015).
147. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 278.
148. Tepfer et al., supra note 25, at 908–09.
149. Id. at 909.
150. Heather M. Kleider-Offutt, Leslie R. Knuycky, Amanda M. Clevinger &
Megan M. Capodanno, Wrongful Convictions and Prototypical Black Features:
Can a Face-Type Facilitate Misidentifications?, 22 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCH. 350,
354–56 (2017).
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3. Interrogations and Confessions
However a youth initially becomes a suspect, youthfulness is a
profound risk factor for wrongfully incriminating oneself during in-
terrogation.151  First, before an interrogation begins, youth almost
always waive their Miranda rights and therefore are subject to po-
lice questioning due to failure to invoke the right to counsel or to
remain silent.152  This waiver is unsurprising given that youth have
substantial deficits in their understanding and appreciation of what
the Miranda rights are and how they function.153  As described
above, children and adolescents especially struggle with reasoning
and decision making in emotional or stressful contexts154 and so,
under the stress of interrogation, youth have an even harder time
figuring out what their rights mean or whether—and how—to exer-
cise them.155  Police capitalize on youth misconceptions and suscep-
tibility to pressure from authority figures by minimizing the
importance of Miranda and giving youth the impression that talking
is in their best interest to increase the likelihood of waiver.156
151. For a full analysis of the ways in which youthful immaturity disadvan-
tages children and adolescents in interrogation contexts, see generally Goldstein et
al., supra note 133.
152. Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops
Question Kids, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 429 (2013).
153. Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Em-
pirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1143–49 (1980); Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein
et al., Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda Rights Comprehension and Self-Reported Like-
lihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 365–66 (2003); Kaitlyn
McLachlan et al., Examining the Role of Interrogative Suggestibility in Miranda
Rights Comprehension in Adolescents, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 167 (2011); Al-
lison D. Redlich et al., Pre-Adjudicative and Adjudicative Competence in Juveniles
and Young Adults, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393, 400–04 (2003); Jennifer L. Woolard et
al., Examining Adolescents’ and their Parents’ Conceptual & Practical Knowledge
of Police Interrogation: A Family Dyad Approach, 37 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE
685, 690–94 (2008); Heather Zelle et al., Juveniles’ Miranda Comprehension: Un-
derstanding, Appreciation, and Totality of Circumstances Factors, 39 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 281, 287–88 (2015).  “[Y]ounger age, lower intelligence, lower academic
achievement, lower socioeconomic status, and greater interrogative suggestibility
predict poorer Miranda comprehension, with large numbers of juveniles having
inadequate comprehension of at least one right.”  Goldstein et al., supra note 133,
at 31.
154. See supra Section II.A.
155. Even adults have significantly reduced understanding of their Miranda
rights when under stress; this effect is likely magnified for youth. See Kyle C.
Scherr & Stephanie Madon, You Have the Right to Understand: The Deleterious
Effect of Stress on Suspects’ Ability to Comprehend Miranda, 36 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 275, 278–79 (2012).
156. See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern
Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 397, 432–36 (1999–2000); BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS:
INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM 76–82 (2013).
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Youth of Color may be especially likely to learn misconceptions
from their parents about the ways in which their rights function in
an interrogation context.157  Additionally, Black youth may be at an
even greater risk for waiving because they may be less likely than
White youth to believe that police will actually respect their Mi-
randa rights if they do invoke them.158
Once a youth has waived their rights, police are free to begin
interrogating them, and the goal of interrogation is to extract a con-
fession from the youth.159  Youth are much more susceptible to po-
lice pressure during interrogation than are adults, and police use
similar coercive  techniques on both adult and child suspects.160  In
fact, a commonly used police interrogation training manual indi-
cates that when interrogating youth over the age of 10, in general—
though some caution may be warranted for individual youth—the
same techniques apply to both adolescents and adults, and the man-
ual includes a special section on how to persuade juvenile suspects
to confess.161  The ways in which police interrogate youth “inadver-
tently or not, play[s] on the susceptibility to pressure and develop-
mental immaturity that are the hallmarks of childhood and
adolescence.”162  Because of their developmental immaturity, in-
cluding high suggestibility, children and adolescents are at much
greater risk than adults of providing false incriminating information
to police.163  One study analyzing recorded interrogations found
that virtually all youth—96 percent—who quickly waived their Mi-
157. In a study of justice-involved youth and their parents, family dyads had
poorer rights understanding when the parent was a racial minority.  Woolard et al.,
supra note 153, at 695.
158. Matthew B. Johnson & Kimberly Citron-Lippmann, Christina Massey,
Chitra Raghavan, & Ann Marie Kavanagh, Interrogation Expectations: Individual
& Race/Ethnic Group Variation Among an Adult Sample, 13 J. ETHNICITY CRIM
JUST. 16, 21–24 (2015).  Among adults, White participants are more likely to be-
lieve police will respect a suspect’s Miranda rights once invoked than are Black
participants, which has likely implications for whether someone undergoing inter-
rogation chooses to invoke their rights. Id.
159. See Feld, supra note 152, at 432–40.
160. Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 137, at 761–77.  Some especially coercive
interrogation techniques—lying and saying there is evidence of the suspect’s guilt;
not allowing the suspect to deny guilt—police use more frequently with child sus-
pects than they do with adults. Id.
161. INBAU ET AL., supra note 131, at 250–55.
162. Goldstein et al., supra note 133, at 40.  For a review of research on inter-
rogations of children and adolescents, see id. at 35–47.
163. Id. at 42.  “More than a quarter of youth incarcerated for serious of-
fenses reported having given true confessions, and seventeen percent reported
having given false confessions.  Indeed, three-quarters of juvenile interrogations
end within fifteen minutes of starting, and over ninety percent end within thirty
minutes, suggesting that children and adolescents provide confessions readily once
Miranda rights are waived.” Id.
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randa rights ultimately made a self-incriminating statement to po-
lice, as did 57 percent of youth who did not immediately waive.164
Therefore, once police identify a youth as a suspect and decide to
conduct an interrogation, the likelihood that the youth will say
something that the prosecutor can use for conviction is extremely
high.  When police interrogate innocent youth, then, a false confes-
sion is the likely outcome, which is borne out by the data:  A large,
disproportionately high, percentage of proven false confessions
were given by youth.165  The presence of a confession all but en-
sures conviction,166 which means that once law enforcement suspect
a youth of a crime they did not commit, it sets off a chain of events
ultimately resulting in a Type A wrongful conviction.
C. Charging
After arrest, the justice system provides incredible discretion
to prosecutors to determine whether to dismiss, divert, or formally
prosecute juvenile cases.167  In 2018, approximately 57 percent of all
delinquency cases were formally processed, 17 percent were dis-
missed at intake, and about a quarter were referred to diversion
programs or services.168  Of those cases that were formally
processed, about a quarter were subsequently dismissed, which is
one indication that the rates of formally processed cases are unnec-
essarily high.  Rates of formal processing have increased because of
tough-on-crime reforms and the increased prosecutorial discretion
over intake decisions.169  Formally processing cases that either lack
legal sufficiency or in which formal prosecution is legally unneces-
sary increases the risk of both Type A and Type B wrongful convic-
tions.  Dismissing or diverting many of these cases at intake can
ameliorate this risk.
164. Feld, supra note 152, at 441, 444.
165. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post- DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 944 (2004); Brandon L. Garrett, Con-
taminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 400 (2015).
166. See Saul M. Kassin, Confession Evidence: Commonsense Myths and Mis-
conceptions, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1309, 1315 (2008).
167. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors: Elected and
Agency Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency and
Child Protection Cases, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 751 (2018).
168. Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics, 1985-2018, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. &
DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://bit.ly/3qLVaqs [https://perma.cc/SH4C-3AUP] (click
“case processing” to access data) (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
169. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 167, at 779.  In 1985, prior to tough-on-crime
reforms, approximately 45 percent of cases were formally prosecuted. Id. The
number of formally petitioned cases increased in the late 1990s, which was also a
time marked by a shift in prosecutorial control resulting in greater prosecutorial
discretion on intake decisions. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 36 24-MAY-21 10:09
688 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:653
1. Diversion
Diverting youth from formal court processing can prevent both
Type A and Type B wrongful convictions; although it cannot miti-
gate the harm caused by wrongful arrest, diversion can prevent a
youth from having a record of delinquency adjudication or convic-
tion.  Diversion is an essential feature of the juvenile justice sys-
tem170 and avoids formal processing by choosing not to file a formal
delinquency petition or criminal charge against the youth and in-
stead refer the youth to programs and services.  Diversion is less
costly to the state while providing interventions absent formal adju-
dication and related stigmatization and collateral consequences.171
Diverting youth from formal prosecution is often seen as a positive
outcome for youth and the community, especially given that prose-
cuting rather than diverting youth may actually increase
recidivism.172
Unfortunately, the decision to divert disproportionately bene-
fits White youth.  A review of over 23,000 delinquent and status
offenders in Arizona revealed that prosecutors were significantly
less likely to informally process Black and Indigenous youth.173  In
a separate analysis reviewing a decade of delinquency referrals
from a Northeastern state, Black youth were nearly twice as likely
as White youth to be referred at intake for further court proceed-
ings.174  Some of the greatest disparities in diversion decision mak-
ing can be seen in misdemeanor offenses or lower-level offenses
that may be more subjective, prone to racial bias, and potentially
more likely to be in response to typical adolescent conduct.  For
example, in a review of delinquency cases in Arizona, youth
charged with obstruction of justice were less likely to be diverted
from formal processing.175  In South Carolina, 76 percent of the
170. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 167, at 750.
171. Id. at 751.  Collateral consequences of justice involvement for youth may
include limitations on future career choices (e.g., being unable to serve in the mili-
tary or in any profession requiring a license), loss of access to public benefits in-
cluding public housing, suspension of expulsion from school, suspension or
revocation of driving privileges, difficulty getting into college, getting a job, sen-
tence enhancements in criminal court, and many other possible impacts on a
youth’s future. See Jennica Janssen, Collateral Consequences for Justice-Involved
Youth: A Model Approach to Reducing the Number of Collateral Consequences, 20
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 25, 35 (2018).
172. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 167, at 751–52.
173. Nancy Rodriguez, The Cumulative Effect of Race and Ethnicity in Juve-
nile Court Outcomes and Why Preadjudication Detention Matters, 47 J. RSCH.
CRIME & DELINQ. 391, 400–02 (2010).
174. Jennifer H. Peck & Wesley G. Jennings, A Critical Examination of “Be-
ing Black” in the Juvenile Justice System, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 224 (2016).
175. Rodriguez, supra note 173, at 403.
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youth charged with disturbing schools were Black.176  When applied
to adolescents, charges such as these often—if not always—consti-
tute Type B wrongful charging.  These lower-level, and arguably
subjective, offenses would likely benefit from alternatives to formal
prosecution yet are often applied to Black youth and formally
processed through the juvenile court system.
Combined with the over-policing of youth of Color and the
criminalization of normative adolescent behavior, formally process-
ing youth of Color at higher rates than White youth further disad-
vantages and drives them deeper into the system.  This can be
clearly seen when considering the impact of prior referrals on fur-
ther system processing.  Having prior referrals is also associated
with prosecutors overlooking a youth for diversion and instead re-
sults in prosecutors being more likely to refer a youth for further
court involvement.177  This means that, once a youth—regardless of
race—receives a Type B wrongful charge, they are more likely to be
pushed deeper into the system with any future charges.  As dis-
cussed in previous sections, it is easier for youth of Color to have a
greater number of priors because they are more likely than White
youth to be unjustly arrested and charged.178  Interestingly, some
research has found that courts are more likely to afford Black youth
leniency at adjudication, a judicial correction that may stem from a
greater proportion of Black youth being unjustly arrested or factu-
ally innocent and inappropriately referred for prosecution.179  De-
ciding to charge youth for normative adolescent conduct is
therefore not only an outcome of racially disparate treatment but
also a contributing factor to greater inequity at later stages of court
processing.
2. Transfer
Formally charging youth in juvenile court sets the stage for in-
creasingly punitive responses; however, one of the harshest out-
comes involves transferring youth to the criminal legal system.
Several discretionary mechanisms exist which allow the adult sys-
tem to try youth,180 a decision prosecutors often justify as in the
176. Disturbing Schools Data, FY 2008–2009, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPART-
MENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, https://bit.ly/3vyNgVc [https://perma.cc/7TR2-MPXN]
(last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
177. Rodriguez, supra note 173, at 402.
178. See supra Section III.A.
179. Peck & Jennings, supra note 174, at 228.
180. Most states have multiple transfer mechanisms:  Judicial waiver which
allows judges to approve the waiver of a juvenile to adult court following a formal
hearing; prosecutorial discretion, which allows prosecutors to decide whether to
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interest of public safety.  Transferring youth to criminal courts is
meant to be reserved for those charged with the most heinous of-
fenses that proponents argue cannot be responded to within the
bounds of juvenile jurisdiction.181  Recent reports, however, contra-
dict prosecutors’ arguments by highlighting that many transferred
youths often end up serving similar sentences to those youth who
remain in the juvenile system (i.e., they remain on probation under
community supervision)182 or, after transfer, have their charges re-
duced to ones that would not be eligible for processing in the adult
system183 and many are even waived back to juvenile court.184  Fur-
ther, many states allow youth to be transferred for even non-violent
offenses depending on their age and previous system involve-
ment,185 begging the question of whether this mechanism is truly
reserved for the most serious offenders.
Transfer policies may increase the risk of wrongful convictions.
Transferred youth are unfortunately perceived as more culpable for
their behavior and their offenses more severe than adult defend-
ants.186  Therefore, the act of transferring youth to adult court in
and of itself increases the overall likelihood of conviction and,
therefore, potentially Type A wrongful convictions.  The threat of
transfer to adult court alone may motivate youth to falsely plead
guilty if it ensures they are tried in juvenile court.  Pleading guilty to
try youth in juvenile or criminal court absent a hearing; statutory exclusion, which
predetermines jurisdiction (i.e., juvenile or criminal court) based on a matrix of
charges by age of the juvenile.  Some states have “once an adult, always an adult”
policies that require juveniles to be prosecuted as adults if they have previously
been convicted in criminal court.  Reverse waiver policies are another transfer
mechanism that allows juveniles charged in criminal court to petition to be re-
manded to juvenile court. See COMM. ON ASSESSING JUV. JUST. REFORM, supra
note 90, at 52–53.
181. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court,
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 13, 13–44 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Frank E. Zimring eds., 2000).
182. S. POVERTY L. CTR., MORE HARM THAN GOOD 1 (2016), https://bit.ly/
3tgAYyE [https://perma.cc/3447-SAVJ].
183. Id.
184. Sheryl Goldstein & Katherine McMullen, Fact Check: A Survey of Avail-
able Data on Juvenile Crime in Baltimore City, 31 ABELL REPORT 1, 1 (2018),
https://bit.ly/31USqgH [https://perma.cc/9WC7-YT22].
185. PATRICK GRIFFIN, SEAN ADDIE, BENJAMIN ADAMS & KATHY
FIRESTINE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER
LAWS AND REPORTING 7 (2011), https://bit.ly/3liecU9 [https://perma.cc/ZB9R-
Z88B] (showing that, of cases transferred, the most serious charge included per-
son, property, drug, and public order offenses or were the result of once adult/
always adult policies).
186. Connie M. Tang, Narina Nunez & Martin Bourgeois, Effects of Trial
Venue and Pretrial Bias on the Evaluation of Juvenile Defendants, 34 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 210, 222–24 (2009).
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charges in juvenile court becomes the goal of plea bargain negotia-
tions when prosecutors use transfer as leverage.187  The threat of
criminal court is incredibly motivating and, in discussing their cli-
ent’s wish to avoid adult court, one attorney stated, “I think it ren-
ders the plea kind of involuntary, frankly . . . it’s hard not to look at
this situation and say, ‘[t]hat is a coerced plea.’”188  When faced
with the option of being tried as an adult or falsely pleading guilty,
it is hard to argue with taking the plea.  Transfer to adult court be-
comes yet another condition, like charge bargaining, that prosecu-
tors can stack against the youth only to bargain them away to
ensure a guilty plea.189
Youth tried as adults will face severe consequences over and
above the more punitive sentencing options that are only available
within the criminal legal system.  For example, unlike youth who
are never transferred, transferred youths’ records are publicly avail-
able, which creates barriers to employment and to opportunities in
higher education.190  Publicly available records can even have a
negative impact on youth who are ultimately remanded back to ju-
venile court.191  In some jurisdictions, youths’ records are available
until a judge decides to remand them to juvenile court and a peti-
tion for expungement is filed.192  During that period, which can
often take months, the public and the media are able to view
youths’ records and publish their photos and identity; the protec-
tions afforded to youth in juvenile court are stripped from trans-
ferred youth.  This is particularly concerning given the findings of a
recent review of juvenile arrests in Baltimore, Maryland, revealing
the court ultimately remanded the majority of youth (67 percent)
charged as adults who requested a transfer hearing back to juvenile
court for formal processing; half of those who remained in the adult
system had their charges dropped, dismissed, or were found not
187. Erika Fountain & Jennifer Woolard, How Defense Attorneys Consult
with Juvenile Clients About Plea Bargains, 24 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 192,
198–201 (2018).
188. Id. at 198.
189. See Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 80 (2011).
190. See Robert Stewart & Christopher Uggen, Piling On: Collateral Conse-
quences and Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1876–77 (2015);
Robert Stewart & Christopher Uggen, Criminal Records and College Admissions:
A Modified Experimental Audit, 58 CRIMINOLOGY 156, 178 (2020).
191. Erika N. Fountain & Bronwyn A. Hunter, Keep All Youth Criminal
Records Confidential, BALT. SUN (JAN. 27, 2020), https://bit.ly/2OhMsDn [https://
perma.cc/2DVN-UUA6] (describing how youth in Baltimore, MD, who were ini-
tially charged as adults but ultimately remanded to juvenile court continued to
have their records publicly available for the public and media to see).
192. Id.
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guilty193 and a quarter of those cases transferred back to juvenile
court ultimately had their charges dismissed.194  These youth, then,
narrowly escaped wrongful conviction—likely Type A for some
youth, Type B for others, and perhaps both types at once for a few.
However, they still experience the damaging effects of justice in-
volvement.  These youth who were transferred to adult court should
have never been there in the first place yet still suffered many con-
sequences of transfer, such as having their information made pub-
licly available and being removed from their homes and held pre-
trial—for an average of 4.5 months, according to the same report.195
These youth were overwhelmingly young Black boys.196
The justice system is more likely to transfer Black youth, typi-
cally boys, to adult court, making them the most vulnerable among
all youth to harsh direct and collateral consequences of this prac-
tice.197  Transferring Black youth at disproportionately higher rates
than White youth not only creates the opportunity for harsher sanc-
tions and collateral consequences but also increases the chances
that Black youth will recidivate.198  The fact that these youth are
disproportionately young men of Color should not come as a sur-
prise.  Instead, it is further evidence of how the legal process sys-
temically and disproportionately penalizes youth of Color over
others.  Publicizing their records makes it more difficult for these
youth to eventually work or attain higher education and removing
them from their homes and communities while awaiting a transfer
hearing eliminates any chance that they benefit from a develop-
mentally appropriate environment during this crucial period.199
The prosecutor’s decision to transfer further disadvantages these
youth, especially those who are ultimately remanded to juvenile
193. Goldstein & McMullen, supra note 184, at 10.
194. Id at 13.
195. See id at 10. Youth who requested a transfer hearing were detained for
an average of 139 days.  Id.
196. MD. DEPT. OF JUV. SERVS., DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2019,
117 (2019), https://bit.ly/30AXYvY [https://perma.cc/BC4Y-MGH8] (showing data
from Maryland indicating that 79.9% of all youth awaiting transfer hearing in pre-
trial detention in 2019 were Black and 94% were male).
197. See Sara L. Bryson & Jennifer H. Peck, Understanding the Subgroup
Complexities of Transfer: The Impact of Juvenile Race and Gender on Waiver Deci-
sions, 18 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 135, 146 (2020).
198. See generally Lawrence Winner, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Donna M. Bishop
& Charles E. Frazier, The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining
Recidivism over the Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548, 558–59 (1997).
199. See Julia Dmitrieva, Kathryn C. Monahan, Elizabeth Cauffman & Lau-
rence Steinberg, Arrested Development: The Effects of Incarceration on the Devel-
opment of Psychosocial Maturity, 24 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1073, 1080–89
(2012).
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court or who were actually innocent to start and had their charges
dismissed.
Scholars have correctly noted that various Supreme Court de-
cisions200 have prompted changes in sentencing practices for youth
tried as adults; however, we have not seen similar progress made
regarding how juvenile or criminal courts charge youth.201  Given
the great discretion afforded to prosecutors, deciding how to charge
(or not) normative adolescent behavior and whether to transfer (or
not) youth are potential areas for intervention.  While it is the re-
sponsibility of each legal actor to reduce the chance for wrongful
charging, wrongful convictions, and the disparate treatment of
youth of Color, it is too late to begin correcting at the adjudication
stage.  By then, youth may have already experienced improper ar-
rest, detention, and formal petitions, which is why prosecutors must
intervene at the charging phase.202
D. Pre-trial Detention
Whether the juvenile system ultimately retains youth or trans-
fers them to the adult system, perhaps one of the most impactful
and problematic decisions throughout the pre-adjudicatory phase is
whether or not to detain the youth at arraignment.203  The court
may detain youth for several reasons including to protect public
safety, to ensure their appearance at future hearings, or for evalua-
tion; in 2018, courts detained youth in 26 percent of all delinquency
cases.204  Unlike in the criminal legal system, when a juvenile court
detains youth the court does not have the option of bail for condi-
tional release, resulting in these youth remaining in detention until
their hearing, about a month on average.205  This decision is criti-
cally important because detaining a youth before they are adjudi-
cated delinquent pushes them toward conviction, as described
below; for youth who have been wrongfully charged under either
type of wrongful charging, detention will help convert those wrong-
ful charges into wrongful convictions.
The consequences of pretrial detention cannot be overstated.
Aside from the psychological consequences of removing youth from
200. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
201. See Henning, supra note 4, at 386.
202. Id. at 429–30.
203. Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids:
An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 291 (2008).
204. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 95, at 29, 32.
205. See The Annie E. Casey Found., Juvenile Detention Explained, CASEY
CONNECTS (Nov. 13, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lcgB2G [https://perma.cc/G2YD-G4KY].
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their families and home environments, detaining youth at this stage
is practically deterministic on later court outcomes.206  Youth who
are detained are more likely to have petitions filed against them,
less likely to have charges dismissed, more likely to plead guilty,
more likely to be adjudicated delinquent, more likely to be placed
in out-of-home placement following adjudication, and more likely
to recidivate.207  Detention increases guilty plea decisions and also
results in increased offending post-release.208  In fact, pretrial de-
tention increases guilty pleas even for charges that would have oth-
erwise been dismissed or for defendants who would have been
acquitted or had their charges dropped.209  Youth have explicitly
described accepting plea offers to get out of jail quickly or to avoid
awaiting trial in detention.210  Therefore, the legal system pushes
youth who are detained toward both Type A and Type B wrongful
convictions.
As with arrest and charging decisions, youth of Color are over-
represented in juvenile detention.211  Race predicts detention deci-
sions over and above various other legal and extra-legal factors that
may contribute to the decision to detain a youth awaiting their ad-
judicatory hearing.212  Although race directly increases the chances
206. See Moriearty, supra note 203, at 291; Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of
Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 511, 512 (2018).  Using a natural experimental design in Philadelphia, PA,
the study shows that pretrial detention in adult courts has “significant downstream
consequences:  a detained defendant is more likely to be convicted, to receive a
lengthy incarceration sentence, and to accrue more courtroom debt.” Id. at 538.
See also Tarika Daftary-Kapur & Tina Zottoli, A First Look at the Plea Deal Ex-
periences of Juveniles Tried in Adult Court, 13 INTL J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH,
323, 328–335 (2014), Rodriguez, supra note 173, at 403–05.
207. Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, supra note 206; Rodriguez, supra note 173, at
403–05; Stevenson, supra note 206, at 512–513; Sarah Cusworth Walker & Jerald
R. Herting, The Impact of Pretrial Detention on 12-Month Recidivism: A Matched
Comparison Study, 66 CRIME & DELINQ. 1865, 1873–82 (2020).
208.  Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 752, 762,
771 (2017). The authors compared similarly situated defendants (controlling for
“offense, defendant demographics, prior criminal record, zip code of residence,
indigence, public defender representation, and time and court of adjudication”)
and found that detained individuals had significantly (statistically and practically)
more new charges than those released on bail. Id. at 761–62.  They also found that
detained individuals are 25 percent more likely to plead guilty “for no reason rele-
vant to guilt.” Id. at 771.  “In other words, the results suggest that approximately
17 percent of the detained misdemeanor defendants in the Harris County dataset
who pleaded guilty would not have been convicted at all had they been released
pretrial.  They pleaded guilty because they were detained.” Id.
209. See id.; Stevenson supra note 206, at 512–13.
210. Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, supra note 206, at 328–31.
211. Rodriguez, supra note 173, at 402.
212. Id.
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of being detained, there are also indirect race effects that can be
seen in line with a cumulative disadvantage framework.  For exam-
ple, having prior referrals increases the chances that a young person
is detained213 and, as discussed previously, youth of Color are dis-
proportionately more likely to have prior referrals through no fault
of their own.214  These prior referrals likely include Type B wrong-
ful charges for normative adolescent behavior that then become
justification for treating youth more harshly the next time they ar-
rive in court.  In the example of Michael’s case, these data suggest
the court would use his initial referral to the system for normative
adolescent misbehavior—stealing a friend’s phone—as justification
for detaining him while awaiting his hearing.  While some may ar-
gue that the decision to detain youth only occurs in the most serious
instances, research has shown that even extralegal factors, such as
the neighborhood in which the youth resides, influence the deten-
tion decision.215  Simply residing in neighborhoods marked by
structural disadvantage significantly increased the chance that a
court will detain a youth, regardless of offense.216  Reviews of court
officials’ case notes revealed they perceived youth affected by resi-
dential instability or concentrated poverty as being in need of court
intervention or oversight, often in the form of detention and con-
finement.217  This coincides with other research showing courts
were less likely to detain and offered lower bail amounts to defend-
ants in Harris County, Texas, who could afford to retain private
counsel than to defendants of Color who did not retain private
counsel.218  What the authors note quite tragically is that defend-
ants who are poor ultimately remain detained, which significantly
impacts the outcome of their case.219  Detaining youth for extrale-
gal reasons—such as their race or economic circumstance—in-
creases the likelihood that juvenile courts are wrongfully detaining
youth whose charges may have otherwise been dismissed.  System-
atically detaining youth of Color for normative adolescent behavior
or who are factually innocent virtually assures wrongful conviction.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 101–120 and accompanying text.
215. Nancy Rodriguez, Concentrated Disadvantage and the Incarceration of
Youth: Examining How Context Affects Juvenile Justice, 50 J. RSCH. CRIME & DE-
LINQ 189, 206–07 (2013).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Rod V. Hissong & Gerald Wheeler, The Role of Private Legal Represen-
tation and the Implicit Effect of Defendants’ Demographic Characteristics in Setting
Bail and Obtaining Pretrial Release, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL. REV. 708, 726 (2019).
219. Id. at 711, 726.
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Detaining youth who may have been wrongfully charged puts
those youth at risk for future offending and punitively punishes
youth who may have otherwise aged out of normative adolescent
offending.  A recent review of 46,000 cases across more than 30 ju-
risdictions found that the practice of detaining youth awaiting adju-
dicatory hearings increased the risk of felony and misdemeanor
recidivism in the year following their release.220  These effects were
strongest for youth with no offending history or minimal offending
history (between one and four prior offenses),221 which suggests
that court intervention may be contributing to, instead of deterring,
problem behavior.  The overrepresentation of youth of Color com-
bined with the damaging impacts of juvenile detention on later
court outcomes and offending behavior highlights the very
nuanced, troublesome, and cumulative effects of this practice.  This
is particularly concerning given the fact that some youth who courts
detain pretrial ultimately plead guilty in cases that courts would
have otherwise dismissed (i.e., they may have been factually inno-
cent) thereby increasing the risk of both Type A and Type B wrong-
ful convictions.222
E. Plea Bargaining
Plea bargains account for approximately 90–95 percent of adult
convictions and juvenile adjudications223 and carry with them a host
of direct and collateral consequences.  Adolescents are known for
making decisions that are short sighted and without appreciation of
the long-term consequences of the decision.224  This age-appropri-
ate tendency is partially why many youth engage in risky behavior,
and it also explains why youth, more so than adults, often waive
their Miranda and trial rights.225  Recent work has increasingly
found that the capacity for shortsighted decision making applies to
the plea bargain context as well.  Youthfulness is a risk factor for
accepting guilty pleas when adults would not,226 falsely pleading
220. Walker & Herting, supra note 207, at 1870, 1876–80.
221. Id. at 1879–80.
222. Stevenson, supra note 206, at 512–13.
223. JUDITH B. JONES, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: ACCESS TO COUNSEL 5
(2004), https://bit.ly/3vfeFLw [https://perma.cc/Y7ML-FEK8]; see Barbara Kaban
& Judith C. Quinlan, Rethinking a “Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver” in
Massachusetts’ Juvenile Courts, 5 J. CTR. FAM., CHILDREN, & CTS. 35, 37 (2004);
Redlich et al, supra note 14, at 339.
224. Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 354.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 353.
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guilty,227 and acquiescing to others’ recommendations228 while lack-
ing the legal knowledge and appreciation of the decision they are
making.229  Factually innocent youth and youth whose normative
behavior has been criminalized are both, then, at greater risk of
entering a wrongful guilty plea than are adults.  Scholars have also
begun to question the voluntariness of youth’s waiver of their trial
rights.230  It is possible that youth who have been wrongfully
charged, and especially those who are detained, are at greater risk
of falsely pleading guilty.  It is becoming increasingly clear that
youthfulness is a risk factor for rash and uninformed plea bargain
decisions,231 and Black youth in particular are again at the greatest
risk as they are also the least likely to benefit from plea
concessions.232
1. Developmental Incompetence
Youthfulness increases the chance that juveniles plead guilty
for immediate gratification and without consideration of the
strength of the evidence or long-term consequences of their deci-
sion.233  Youthfulness also places youth at risk of making decisions
that are not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.234  Grisso and col-
227. Malloy et al., supra note 14, at 186; Allison D. Redlich & Reveka
Shteynberg, To Plead or Not to Plead: A Comparison of Juvenile and Adult True
and False Plea Decisions, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 611, 611–25 (2016); Zottoli et al.,
supra note 36, at 254.
228. See Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 353; Erika Fountain, Adolescent Plea
Bargains: Developmental and Contextual Influences of Plea Bargain Decision
Making 80 (2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with the
Georgetown University library system); Viljoen, Klaver & Roesch, supra note 74,
at 265.
229. Tina M. Zottoli & Tarika Daftary-Kapur, Guilty Pleas of Youths and
Adults: Differences in Legal Knowledge and Decision Making. 43 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 166, 166–79 (2019).
230. See generally Jean J. Cabell & Shawn C. Marsh, Swing and a Miss: Re-
flections on the “Voluntariness” of Pleas in Juvenile Court, 117 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVS. REV. 1 (2020).
231. Zottoli & Daftary-Kapur, supra note 229, at 166–79.
232. John D. Burrow & Patrick G. Lowery, A Preliminary Assessment of the
Impact of Plea Bargaining among a Sample of Waiver-Eligible Offenders, 13
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 211, 219 (2015); Vanessa A. Edkins, Defense At-
torney Plea Recommendations and Client Race: Does Zealous Representation Ap-
ply Equally to All?, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 413 (2011); Patrick G. Lowery, Plea
Bargains Among Serious and Violent Girls: An Intersectional Approach Exploring
Race in the Juvenile Court, 14 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 115, 126 (2019).
233. Daftary-Kapur & Zottoli, supra note 206, at 331; Michele Peterson-
Badali & Rona Abramovitch, Grade Related Changes in Young People’s Reason-
ing about Plea Decisions, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 537, 544–49 (1993).
234. Zottoli & Daftary-Kapur, supra note 229, at 176; see generally Cabell &
Marsh supra note 230. See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)
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leagues found that youth were more likely to recommend accepting
a plea offer than adults; the older adolescents were, the less likely
they were to recommend accepting the plea.235  This finding also
extends to false guilty pleas, as youth are more likely to recommend
pleading guilty even when they are factually innocent.236  Youth are
also more likely to make decisions that comply with authority
figures’ suggestions;237 specifically, youth are more likely to plead
guilty when they know their attorney, their parents, or their peers
believed they should do so.238  This is not surprising given that ado-
lescence is a period in which decisions are normatively influenced
by peers and authority figures.  Youth, then, may be pushed toward
a wrongful guilty plea of either type when an adult would not be.
In line with this work on juvenile legal decision making, schol-
ars have recently cast doubt on the validity of juvenile plea bargain
decisions given the awesome influence of the legal system com-
bined with the ongoing development of adolescents’ decision-mak-
ing capacities.239  Given that defense attorneys perceive adolescents
as less engaged with the legal process than adults,240 it is perhaps
not surprising that their ultimate plea decisions are more passive as
well.  Recent findings have also raised questions about whether ad-
olescents have the necessary capacities to competently plead
guilty.241  Researchers who interviewed adolescents and adults who
had pled guilty to criminal charges in New York City found that
youth knew significantly less than adults about the consequences of
their plea and misunderstood the rights they had waived.242  For
example, youth were less likely to know that pleading guilty would
result in a criminal record or to know what a trial actually is.243
That youth are less likely than adults to have the capacities neces-
sary to competently plead guilty is worsened by the reality that
(holding that a defendant’s plea of guilty must be made intelligently and volunta-
rily to be considered valid).
235. Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 350–53.
236. Redlich & Shteynberg supra note 227, at 611–25.
237. Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 357.
238. Id. at 353; Viljoen, Klaver & Roesch, supra note 74, at 265.
239. Zottoli & Daftary-Kapur, supra note 229, at 166–79; see generally Cabell
& Marsh, supra note 230.
240. Skye A. Woestehoff, Allison D. Redlich, Elizabeth J. Cathcart & Jodi A.
Quas, Legal Professionals’ Perceptions of Juvenile Engagement in the Plea Process,
TRANSLATIONAL ISSUES PSYCH. SCI. 121, 127 (2019).
241. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969).  To plead guilty, a
defendant must, constitutionally, be competent to proceed (see infra notes 259–67
and accompanying text) and waive the rights inherent in a guilty plea in a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary manner.  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396–99 (1993).
242. Zottoli & Daftary-Kapur, supra note 229, at 170–77.
243. Id.
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youth spend very little time discussing the plea with their attor-
neys.244  Indeed, attorneys describe feeling rushed themselves and
having difficulty evaluating competence “on the fly.”245  Even when
attorneys do recognize that competence to plead guilty may be an
issue, many attorneys describe not raising it for strategic reasons246
which increases the likelihood that youth are more likely than
adults to accept pleas without being legally competent to do so.247
2. False Guilty Pleas
That youth may not have the necessary capacities to plead
guilty is incredibly concerning and may help explain why youth are
more likely to enter false guilty pleas.  A recent study found that
youth were twice as likely compared to adults to recommend ac-
cepting a guilty plea when factually innocent.248  Approximately a
quarter of youth who were interviewed after pleading guilty to felo-
nies in New York City claimed to be entirely innocent of all the
charges.249  Similarly, interviews with incarcerated youth revealed
that approximately 18 percent had falsely pled guilty and the aver-
age age of first false admission was 14 years old.250  These early
false admissions beg the question of how often first offenses might
be the result of a false guilty plea.  Allowing youth to consider plea
offers without the necessary time to consult with an attorney or the
oversight of a competency hearing may result in youth falsely
pleading guilty to crimes of which they were factually innocent.
3. Racial Disparities in Plea Offers
Compounding the disadvantage posed by developmental in-
competence is the well documented fact that defendants of Color,
particularly Black defendants, are less likely to benefit from
favorable pleas.251  Some evidence suggests that Black defendants
244. Fountain & Woolard, supra note 187, at 192.
245. Id. at 196.
246. Amanda Nemoyer, Sharon Kelley, Heather Zelle & Naomi E.S. Gold-
stein, Attorney Perspectives on Juvenile and Adult Clients’ Competence to Plead
Guilty, 24 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 171 (2018).
247. Infra notes 259–67 and accompanying text.
248. Redlich & Shteynberg, supra note 227, at 616.
249. Zottoli et al., supra note 36, at 254.
250. Malloy et al., supra note 14, at 6.
251. See generally Burrow & Lowery, supra note 232; Besiki Luka Kutale-
ladze, Nancy R. Andiloro & Brian D. Johnson, Opening Pandora’s Box: How Does
Defendant Race Influence Plea Bargaining?, 33 JUST. Q. 398 (2016); Christi Met-
calfe & Ted Chiricos, Race, Plea, and Charge Reduction: An Assessment of Racial
Disparities in the Plea Process, 35 JUST. Q. 223 (2018); Alexander Testa & Brian D.
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are less likely than White defendants to plead guilty,252 which
means that, when a plea really is the best available option, youth of
Color may access it less frequently than White youth.  When prose-
cutors offer pleas, several studies indicate plea terms vary by race
resulting in more favorable pleas for White defendants:  Prosecu-
tors are less likely to offer Black defendants pleas to lesser
charges,253 more likely to offer pleas to the current charge,254 and
more likely to offer Black defendants pleas that include a term of
confinement.255  Though prosecutors certainly contribute to the ra-
cial bias observed in plea offers, defense attorneys also contribute
to these disparities through their negotiations and subsequent rec-
ommendations to clients.  Even when defense attorneys perceived
White defendants as guiltier, they still recommended Black defend-
ants take pleas with harsher terms than they recommended to
White defendants.256  For example, research found defense attor-
neys to be three times more likely to recommend a plea that in-
cluded jail time to Black defendants compared to white
defendants.257  This could be a result of their implicit bias or might
be their belief that they would be less successful negotiating a more
favorable plea for defendants of Color.  As a result, those charged
with protecting youths’ rights can only do so much to combat the
systemic injustices that exist and “at worst, actively contribute to
the harm imposed on black youth through implicit bias colorblind-
ness, benign neglect, and outright discrimination.”258
Youthfulness and race both increase the risk of problematic
outcomes in the plea bargain context.  Developmental incompe-
tence leaves youth vulnerable to making uninformed and poten-
tially involuntary plea bargain decisions.  When adolescents are
charged with a crime of which they are factually innocent (a Type A
wrongful charging), the system functions to put a Black youth at
greater risk of a terrible outcome compared to a White youth.
Even when pleading guilty is the best outcome for the youth’s case,
Black youth are less likely to benefit from advantageous terms.
Johnson, Paying the Trial Tax: Race, Guilty Pleas, and Disparity in Prosecution, 31
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 500 (2020).
252. Metcalfe & Chiricos, supra note 251; Testa & Johnson, supra note 251.
253. Metcalfe & Chiricos, supra note 251; Kutaleladze et al., supra note 251.
254. Kutaleladze et al., supra note 251.
255. Id.
256. Edkins, supra note 232.
257. Id.
258. See Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 649, 649–50 (2017).
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F. Trial or Adjudicatory Hearing
Even for youth who resist the pressure to admit guilt in ex-
change for a plea, the cumulative disadvantage pushing youth to-
ward a wrongful conviction continues.  At the trial stage (for youth
processed as adults in criminal court) or the adjudicatory hearing
stage (for youth processed in juvenile court), the same system bi-
ases and youth vulnerabilities due to immaturity increase the likeli-
hood of a conviction or delinquency adjudication.  This happens
through at least two mechanisms:  Youth difficulty participating
meaningfully in the trial or adjudicatory hearing, and disadvantage
created by challenges in the youth/attorney relationship.
1. Youth Adjudicatory Competence
Children and adolescents, as a whole, have poor adjudicatory
competence—they do not have fully developed “capacities to assist
counsel and to understand the nature of the proceeding sufficiently
to participate in it and make decisions about rights afforded all de-
fendants.”259  Specifically, roughly twice as many youth under the
age of 16 as compared to young adults have impaired understanding
and appreciation of aspects of the trial or trial-related rights or im-
paired reasoning related to trial.260  These deficits are especially
pronounced for youth who also have lower IQs261—who are also at
greater risk of false confession during the interrogation phase,262
and therefore see the impact of their vulnerability compounded at
trial.
Despite robust research illustrating that children and adoles-
cents often do not possess an adequate understanding of trial suffi-
cient to participate meaningfully in their own defense,263 the law is
259. Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 334.  For a criminal court proceeding to
provide sufficient due process to satisfy constitutional requirements, trial can occur
only when a defendant is competent to stand trial, which means that they have a
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
This legal standard has been operationalized within psycholegal scholarship and
research as requiring a defendant have “a basic comprehension of the purpose and
nature of the trial process (Understanding), the capacity to provide relevant infor-
mation to counsel and to process information (Reasoning), and the ability to apply
information to one’s own situation in a manner that is neither distorted nor irra-
tional (Appreciation).”  Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 335.
260. Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 343–51.
261. Id.
262. See Goldstein et al., supra note 133, at 43.
263. E.g., Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 356; Jodi L. Viljoen & Ronald
Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights & Adjudicative Competence in
Adolescent Defendants: Cognitive Development, Attorney, Contact, & Psychologi-
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structured in a way that makes it unlikely a youth’s lack of compe-
tence will prevent their adjudication or conviction.  First, the issue
of a defendant’s lack of competence is most commonly raised by
defense attorneys, who are in the best position to identify problems
in a client’s reasoning about trial or ability to effectively help their
attorney with their defense.264  However, attorneys who represent
children and adolescents report that, even though attorneys com-
monly have concerns about their young clients’ trial competence,
they do not always raise the issue for the court—including in cases
in which the charges are relatively minor,265 as may often be the
case for youth whose normative behavior has been criminalized.
Even though youth are more likely than adults to lack trial compe-
tence, in many jurisdictions developmental immaturity is not a le-
gally sufficient basis for a finding of incompetence—instead, in
these states, a defendant can only be found incompetent if incom-
petence results from mental illness or cognitive disability.266  In
states that do not recognize developmental immaturity as a grounds
for incompetence, some youth will proceed to trial even when they
do not understand what is happening and cannot help their attor-
ney.267  As a result, the possibility of a court convicting a youth who
is incompetent to proceed is present both for youth who were
wrongfully criminalized through their factual innocence (Type A)
or through being charged with a minor offense that should not be
considered criminal in the first place (Type B).
cal Symptoms, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 736 (2005); Susan LaVelle Ficke, Kath-
leen J. Hart & Paul A. Deardorff, The Performance of Incarcerated Juveniles on
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication, J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 360, 371 (2006); Kathryn A. Cunningham, Advances in Juvenile
Adjudicative Competence: A 10-Year Update, 38 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 406, 407 (2020).
264. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966); Mark C. Bardwell & Bruce
A. Arrigo, Competency to Stand Trial: A Law, Psychology, and Policy Assessment,
30 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 147, 203 (2002).
265. Jodi L. Viljoen, Kaitlyn McLachlan, Twila Wingrove & Erika Penner,
Defense Attorneys’ Concerns About the Competence of Adolescent Defendants, 28
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 630, 636–39 (2010).  Almost all—86.9 percent—attorneys sur-
veyed about their representation of young clients reported having concerns about
competence for some of their clients, but these juvenile defense attorneys also in-
dicated they only request a competence evaluation in roughly half of the cases in
which they think the youth may not be competent. Id. at 636–42.
266. Nancy Ryba Panza, Emily Deutsch & Kelsey Hamann, Statutes Gov-
erning Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial Proceedings: An Analysis of Consistency
with Best Practice Recommendations, 26 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 274, 277 (2020).
Only 15 states have statutes specifically indicating a finding of incompetence can
be predicated on developmental immaturity. Id.
267. Twila A. Wingrove, Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to
Avoid Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?, 86 NEB. L. REV. 488, 506–09 (2007).
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2. Youth–Attorney Relationships
Whether or not they have adequate understanding of the adju-
dicatory process, challenges in the youth-defense attorney relation-
ship may disadvantage some youth.  First, deficient legal
representation is commonplace in juvenile court, where attorneys:
[D]o not interview witnesses or visit the crime scene.  They do
not file pre-trial motions. They do not prepare for dispositional
hearings . . . In many instances, . . . attorneys do not meet with
their juvenile clients outside of court appearances.  Often, they
meet with them for the first time on the day of trial.268
Even attorneys who are passionate advocates and would like to
carefully handle every case may find themselves unable to do so
given juvenile defense attorney caseloads of 500–1,500 cases per
year.269  Although these practices would be extremely problematic
for an attorney representing an adult client, when the client is a
child or adolescent, the client cannot advocate effectively for them-
selves, “thus all but ensuring a delinquent adjudication.”270  Addi-
tionally, such poor lawyering reinforces a youth’s perception of the
system as unjust, which may itself lead to future system involve-
ment.271  Youth who receive ineffective legal representation in juve-
nile court do, in theory, have access to the same mechanisms for
redress as adults do:  Filing an appeal raising an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.272  However, in practice, juveniles almost
never file such claims and, when they do, the claim almost never
results in appellate relief.273  Consequently, when a youth is inap-
propriately charged (a Type B wrongful charge) and is subsequently
adjudicated delinquent because, in part, of substandard lawyering,
the wrongful delinquency adjudication is likely to stand.
Even when an attorney provides an adequate defense to a child
or adolescent, youth of Color may have an especially hard time re-
ceiving robust representation, given both attorney biases and youth
response to system inequalities.  A large majority of attorneys in
the United States are White—nearly 90 percent274—which means
268. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold on the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 771, 792–93 (2010).
269. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 291.
270. Fedders, supra note 268, at 792–95.
271. Id. at 797.  See also supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text.
272. Fedders, supra note 268, at 802–03.
273. Id. at 806.  See id. at 807–13 for a discussion of the barriers to ineffective
assistance of counsel claims arising from deficient representation in juvenile court.
274. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2016 NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2016).
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that White attorneys usually represent youth of Color.  White attor-
neys may be less likely to experience empathy for their young Black
or Latinx clients, less likely to challenge racialized language or bi-
ases about their client that are presented in court,275 and less likely
to hold their Black clients in high regard.276  These biases may
mean that defense attorneys are less likely to believe in the inno-
cence of their young clients of Color, which may shape the ways in
which they represent these youth and whether or not the youth ulti-
mately receives a Type A wrongful conviction.  Additionally, when
youth of Color are aware of an attorney’s biases against them, it
rightfully impacts youths’ perceptions of their attorney, such that
Black youth perceive their attorneys as less trustworthy.277  This
lack of trust may negatively impact youths’ willingness to talk
openly with their attorney or follow attorney recommendations,
and “may put them at a considerable disadvantage when compared
with other defendants.”278  Among individuals who are wrongfully
charged, then, because of factual innocence or because of criminal-
ization of developmentally normative behavior, youthfulness cre-
ates a greater risk of wrongful charging turning into a Type A or
Type B wrongful conviction/adjudication.  Further, as in every stage
of justice system processing—the disadvantage is worse for youth of
Color than for White youth.
G. Juvenile Dispositions
Youth who are ultimately adjudicated delinquent will proceed
to disposition hearings in which courts may place youth on proba-
tion or community supervision or confine them to a residential
treatment facility.279  For youth who were wrongfully convicted—
either due to factual innocence (Type A) or wrongful charging of
normative adolescent behavior (Type B)—the disposition phase
presents several unfortunate situations that may all lead to sus-
tained justice system involvement.  Even though courts place the
majority of youth on court supervision,280 many youth fail to meet
275. Birckhead, supra note 88, at 454–57.
276. Joseph J. Avery, Jordan Starck, Yiqiao Zhong, Jonathan D. Avery & Joel
Cooper, Is Your Own Team Against You? Implicit Bias & Interpersonal Regard in
Criminal Defense, J. SOC. PSYCH. 1, 8–10 (2020).  This study of criminal defense
attorneys found anti-Black implicit bias among a large majority of defense attor-
neys, which was associated with lower regard for their Black clients. Id.
277. Melinda G. Schmidt, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard, Effec-
tiveness of Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship,
21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175, 190 (2003).
278. Id. at 192.
279. COMM. ON ASSESSING JUV. JUST. REFORM, supra note 90, at 56–57.
280. HOCKENBERRY & PUZZANCHERA, supra note 95, at 50.
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the court-mandated requirements:  A recent review of 120 case files
found that half of the youth failed to meet all requirements.281  Fail-
ure to meet these requirements can lead to probation revocation
and confinement.282  In fact, approximately one in five confined
youth are held for technical violations of their probation.283  If
courts do not initially place youth on community supervision, they
may refer youth to out-of-home placement at a residential facility.
In each of these scenarios, wrongfully convicted youth are placed in
situations that increase the likelihood of sustained system involve-
ment.  In the case of community probation, noncompliance holds
youth back from reentry; out-of-home placement does not have the
rehabilitative effects intended and, in some cases, can increase of-
fending post-release.284
As with each previous stage of justice processing, Black youth,
particularly males, experience more punitive dispositions than
White youth285 and are less likely to successfully comply with pro-
bationary requirements.286  Researchers reviewed probation of-
ficers’ written court reports, finding that probation officers were
more likely to attribute Black youth’s offending behavior to indi-
vidual characteristics such as a deficient or criminal personality.287
Comparatively, these same officers described White youth’s offend-
ing behavior as influenced by their extenuating circumstances, such
as their social environment.  In other words, these officers per-
ceived Black youth as more culpable and blameworthy for their of-
fending behavior compared to White youth.  As a result, these
probation officers would recommend more punitive dispositions for
Black youths and attribute those recommendations to their percep-
tion that Black youth are more dangerous or had a deviant person-
ality.288  On the other hand, officers perceived White youth as
281. Amanda NeMoyer, Naomi E. Goldstein, Rhona L. McKitten, Ana
Prelic, Jenna Ebbecke, Erika Foster & Casey Burkard, Predictors of Juveniles’
Noncompliance with Probation Requirements, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 580, 583
(2014).
282. Id.
283. Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement, OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://bit.ly/3vqM9Xi [https://perma.cc/37BX-
T2Q3] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
284. Thomas Loughran et al., Estimating a Dose-Response Relationship be-
tween Length of Stay and Future Recidivism in Serious Juvenile Offenders, 47.3
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 726 (2009).
285. Rodriguez, supra note 173, at 406.
286. Nemoyer et al., supra note 281, at 584.
287. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assess-
ments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63
AM. SOCIO. REV. 554, 567 (1998).
288. Id.
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benefitting from more therapeutic responses.289  This means that
the sanction may be more serious for wrongfully adjudicated Black
youth than for wrongfully adjudicated White youth.
1. Out-of-Home Placement
Youth with a prior wrongful conviction are at greater risk of
more severe sanctions in the future.  Having prior offenses and hav-
ing been detained pre-trial both increase the chance that courts will
refer youth to out-of-home placement.290  Black youth, in particu-
lar, are more likely to be removed from their homes and confined
in residential facilities.  In a review of 23,000 delinquency cases in
Arizona, Black youth were more likely than White youth to receive
out-of-home placement.291  Even within confinement, some evi-
dence suggests that Black youth are less likely to be placed in
mental health treatment or drug treatment facilities and more likely
than White youth to be placed in programs that emphasize punish-
ment or physical labor such as traditional detention facilities, boot
camps, or wilderness programs similar to the program to which the
court referred Michael.292  In other words, legal decision makers
take a racialized view on how to best respond to youth and ulti-
mately may see White youth as more deserving of treatment than
Black youth.  This coincides with other research described earlier
that shows probation officers attribute Black youths’ behavior as
indicative of internal characteristics as opposed to White youth who
officers perceived as responding to conditions of their
environment.293
Compared to adults, youth may face additional disadvantage
because their family’s economic circumstances might inform how
legal decision makers perceive their need for intervention.294  Juve-
nile court officials perceive youth residing in areas marked by con-
centrated poverty as in need of intervention which ultimately
results in confinement.295  This stems from a belief that youth who
reside in areas marked by concentrated poverty or structural disad-
vantage are more likely to recidivate and would benefit from cor-
rectional confinement over continuing to reside with their
289. Jamie J. Fader, Megan C. Kurlychek & Kristin A. Morgan, The Color of
Juvenile Justice: Racial Disparities in Dispositional Decisions, 44 SOC. SCI. RSCH.
126, 134–37 (2014).
290. Rodriguez, supra note 173, at 404.
291. Id. at 404–05.
292. Fader et al., supra note 289, at 134.
293. Bridges & Steen, supra note 287, at 562–64.
294. See generally Rodriguez, supra note 215.
295. Id.
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families.296  Further, officials are more likely to confine youth
whose families receive public assistance.297  The economic condi-
tion of the youth’s family impacts how severely the court may re-
spond to the child’s offense.  Therefore, the youthfulness
disadvantage begins with the criminalization of normative adoles-
cent behavior (Type B charging) and again for their status as depen-
dent minors who depend on their family for financial support.
Black youth whose families experience poverty are “doubly disad-
vantaged by their economic situation and by their race” insofar as
these factors increase the likelihood that they will receive more se-
vere sanctions.298
2. Fines and Fees
Given court officials’ awareness of family economic circum-
stances and their perception that poverty negatively influences jus-
tice-involved youths’ behavior, it is surprising how often officials
place fines, fees, and restitution on justice-involved youth and their
families.  Imposing financial sanctions on families is incredibly
problematic, particularly for youth of Color:  Research has linked
economic sanctions to increases in recidivism and probation revoca-
tion for Black youth.299  A review of California fines and fees re-
vealed that justice involved youth are liable for thousands of dollars
in fines and fees with Black families being liable for more than
double the amount of fees as White families.300  Youth of color are
also more likely to have outstanding costs after their case is
closed.301  Given that the legal system disproportionately impacts
youth in poverty and of Color, these practices unnecessarily exacer-
bate these existing disparities and further push youth of Color and
296. Id. at 207.
297. Id. at 201.
298. Patrick G. Lowery, John D. Burrow & Robert J. Kaminski, A Multilevel
Test of the Racial Threat Hypothesis in One State’s Juvenile Court, 64 CRIME &
DELINQ. 53, 74 (2018).
299. Stacy Hoskins Haynes, Allison C. Cares & R. Barry Ruback, Juvenile
Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of Their Imposition, Payment, & Effect on Recid-
ivism, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 46–47 (2014).
300. Jeffrey Selbin, Juvenile Fee Abolition in California: Early Lessons and
Challenges for the Debt-Free Justice Movement, 98 N.C. L. REV. 401, 408 (2020).
“[C]ompared to White families ($1637), Black families with a youth in the juvenile
legal system were liable for more than double the fees ($3438), Latinx families
were liable for more than one and a half times the fees ($2563), and Asian families
were liable for almost forty percent more fees ($2269).” Id.
301. Alex R. Piquero & Wesley G. Jennings, Research Note: Justice System-
Imposed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidivism in a Sample of
Adolescent Offenders, 15 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 325, 331 (2016).
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youth in poverty into the system.302  These youth are ultimately
pushed deeper into the system because in many states (half or
more), the inability to pay these fines and fees can result in punitive
sanctions such as being confined, the inability to request expunge-
ment, cases remaining open longer, or youth remaining in place-
ment for longer time periods.303  For wrongfully convicted youth,
remaining indebted to the juvenile courts is yet another way to en-
sure their sustained system involvement.
H. Post-Disposition
Wrongful conviction, youthfulness, and race each decrease the
likelihood of a good outcome following sentencing or disposition
and, for wrongfully convicted youth of Color, the path following
disposition is likely especially difficult.  After disposition, those who
are factually innocent—youth with a Type A wrongful conviction—
ideally will be able to appeal their conviction or adjudication and
have their innocence vindicated.  Those whose normative conduct
has been wrongfully criminalized—youth with a Type B wrongful
conviction—ideally will be able to quickly resolve their court in-
volvement and return to their lives.  Both groups should be able to
move forward minimizing the negative lasting impacts of justice in-
volvement.  However, youth, and particularly youth of Color, face
numerous barriers to concluding their justice involvement and mov-
ing on following wrongful conviction.
1. Correcting Wrongful Adjudications/Convictions
First, when something has gone wrong in the justice process
resulting in a wrongful conviction, either public outrage or the legal
appeal structure should create momentum to correct the wrong.
When a court processes a youth as a juvenile, however, the likeli-
hood of redress through either public outrage or through a success-
ful appeal is greatly reduced.  In many states, juvenile delinquency
hearings—unlike criminal court hearings—are closed to the public,
and this sometimes also means exclusion of the press.304  As a re-
sult, juvenile courtrooms escape public scrutiny, and wrongful out-
302. Leigh Shapiro, The Crippling Costs of the Juvenile Justice System: A Le-
gal and Policy Argument for Eliminating Fines and Fees for Youth Offenders, 69
EMORY L.J. 1305, 1341 (2020).
303. Jessica Feierman, Naomi Goldstein, Emily Haney-Caron & Jaymes
Fairfax Columbo, Debtors’ Prison for Kids? The High Cost of Fines & Fees in the
Juvenile Justice System, JUV. L. CTR. 3–4 (2016), https://bit.ly/3wAaTNH [https://
perma.cc/X6M7-B4XE].
304. See Courtney R. Clark, Collateral Damage: How Closing Juvenile Delin-
quency Proceedings Flouts the Constitution and Fails to Benefit the Child, 46 U.
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comes in juvenile court may occur without public outrage—or even
public knowledge.  Scholars in this area note, “The closure of juve-
nile courtrooms to the general public and press can result in shield-
ing ‘improper judicial behavior’ from ‘public view,’ and thereby
deny the juvenile victims of that judicial misconduct the opportu-
nity for ‘executive redress through the medium of public
indignation.’”305
At the same time, the oversight that appellate courts should
provide is much less present for juvenile proceedings than for crimi-
nal court cases.306  Although juvenile cases may, in theory, provide
the same right to appeal, most states do not provide counsel for
juveniles at the appellate stage.307  Children and adolescents, who
have deficits in their understanding of legal processes308 and are
developmentally ill-equipped to navigate complex legal decision
making,309 are profoundly unable to initiate an appeal of a wrongful
adjudication on their own, much less to do so successfully.  Collat-
eral relief, resulting from an individual filing a post-conviction peti-
tion after exhausting their direct appeal, is a common avenue to
raising evidence of innocence to seek an exoneration.310  However,
some states bar youth adjudicated delinquent from seeking collat-
eral review:  Juvenile cases may be excluded from statutes provid-
ing for post-conviction DNA testing, prohibited from writs of
habeas corpus in state court, or given an unreasonably short period
to pursue collateral relief.311  Because of this exclusion, many chil-
dren and adolescents who have a Type A wrongful delinquency ad-
judication in juvenile court have no route to vindicating their
rights—or their innocence.  Wrongfully convicted juveniles, then,
are at increased risk compared to wrongfully convicted adults that
the wrongful conviction will stand.312
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 199, 213–21 (2007), for a review of statutory approaches to
juvenile court confidentiality. See also Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 306–10.
305. Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Selling Kids Short: How Rights for
Kids Turned into Kids for Cash, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 653, 670 (2016) (quoting McK-
eiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 555 (1971)).
306. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 294–95.
307. Fedders, supra note 268, at 812.
308. Grisso et al., supra note 68, at 343–51.
309. See supra Section II.A.
310. Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles & Collateral
Relief, 64 ME. L. REV. 553, 554 (2012).
311. Id. at 558–63.
312. Id. at 574.
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2. Ending Justice Involvement
Because delinquency dispositions are generally indeterminate
in nature,313 a youth with a Type B wrongful adjudication will re-
main under juvenile court supervision either until aging out of juve-
nile court jurisdiction314 or until the court is satisfied that the
system has rehabilitated the youth.315  Children and adolescents
who are under juvenile court supervision for nothing more than
typical adolescent behavior face the challenge, then, of convincing a
judge they have been rehabilitated.  However, if all that was
“wrong” with the youth was normative developmental immaturity,
how do they illustrate that they have been “fixed,” other than wait-
ing for neural and psychosocial development to occur?  Not all
states guarantee representation for juveniles at this post-disposition
stage, making it even more challenging for a youth to convince the
court to terminate court supervision.316  This results in situations
like Michael’s, described in the introduction:  A youth is wrongfully
criminalized, and then cannot prove their criminality has been
cured because, in fact, it was never present.  A similar barrier to
post-disposition justice may exist for youth who are factually inno-
cent.  After conviction, juvenile courts (for youth processed in the
juvenile system) or parole boards (for youth tried as adults) may
expect that the youth take responsibility and express remorse as a
condition of release.317  For those who are factually innocent, with
Type A wrongful convictions, admitting guilt may be morally repre-
hensible to the degree that they choose instead to remain incarcer-
ated.318  Additionally, although we are aware of no data on this
point, for those who do decide to wrongfully admit responsibility, it
may be difficult for the innocent to convey convincing remorse for
something they did not do,319 especially for Black boys who these
legal actors may view through the lens of the superpredator.320
313. Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure
Juveniles A Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Pro-
cess, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 175, 181–82 (2007).
314. Commonly at age 21. Id. at 181.
315. Id.
316. See generally id.
317. See generally Nicole Bronnimann, Remorse in Parole Hearings: An Elu-
sive Concept with Concrete Consequences, 85 MO. L. REV. 321 (2020). See also
Leslie Scott, It Never, Ever Ends: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Convic-
tion, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 10, 11 (2010); Levick & Desai, supra note 313, at 189.
318. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of
Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 513–28 (2008).
319. Id. at 496.
320. For a discussion of the impact of the superpredator myth on the exper-
iences of youth of Color within the justice system, see generally Robin W. Sterling,
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Wrongful conviction, then, does not end with conviction; it has the
potential to extend through a lengthy disposition or sentence with
little hope of redress.
3. Lasting Stigma and Disrupted Futures
Finally, once a wrongfully convicted youth has completed their
sentence or disposition and the court releases them from supervi-
sion, they may have a hard time returning to the developmental
path they were on before their court involvement—both because of
the stigma stemming from their justice involvement and because
wrongful conviction may increase future criminality.  When the sys-
tem processes youth as adults, their legal records are fully public;
even for youth processed as juveniles, no state provides full confi-
dentiality for juvenile court records.321  The existence of a delin-
quency or criminal record can limit a youth’s access to educational
opportunities, make it difficult for the youth to get a job or limit a
youth’s available career options, or even prevent the youth from
securing housing.322  Additionally, if the public knows of their jus-
tice involvement, youth may face stigma within their communi-
ties.323  This stigma may be particularly extreme and harmful for
Black boys, who face the added stigma of the societal myth of the
young, Black male as a superpredator.324  Even apart from the im-
pact of this stigma, justice involvement itself is often iatrogenic for
youth; involvement in the system disrupts the natural desistence
from delinquent behavior that would otherwise occur as youth
“Children Are Different”: Implicit Bias, Rehabilitation, and the “New” Juvenile Ju-
risprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019, 1044–62 (2013).
321. See JUVENILE LAW CENTER, FAILED POLICIES, FORFEITED FUTURES:
REVISING A NATIONWIDE SCORECARD ON JUVENILE RECORDS, 2–8 (2020), https://
bit.ly/3mbBxri [https://perma.cc/HCY5-LMG8].
322. See RIYA SAHA SHAH & JEAN STOUT, FUTURE INTERRUPTED: THE COL-
LATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS 6–9
(2016), https://bit.ly/3tJQy63 [https://perma.cc/7WU5-RUHC]; see generally Hen-
ning, supra note 54.  For research on the experiences of stigma faced by individuals
seeking expungement, see, e.g., Simone Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefi-
nite Punishment and the Criminal Record: Stigma Reports Among Expungement-
Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387, 398, 406 (2016).
323. Erika Diaz Ortiz, Charise Peters, & Emily Haney-Caron, Innocent until
Proven Arrested? Youth Justice System Involvement and Public Perceptions of
Guilt, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY-LAW SOCIETY VIRTUAL POSTER SESSION (2021).
The greater a youth’s justice involvement, the more that stigma of guilt attaches,
and perceptions of a youth’s guilt may begin as early as when a youth is questioned
for a crime (well before guilt is legally determined). Id.
324. Michael E. Jennings, Trayvon Martin and the Myth of Superpredator, in
TRAYVON MARTIN, RACE, & AMERICAN JUSTICE: WRITING WRONG 191, 192–93
(Kenneth J. Fasching-Varner, Rema E. Roynolds, Katrice A. Albert & Lori L.
Martin eds., 2014).
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age.325  Therefore, a youth who was not engaging in truly criminal
behavior prior to involvement in the justice system may be more
likely to do so once their involvement with the system ends.  Youth
who are wrongfully charged and convicted, with either type, then,
are pushed down a path increasing the likelihood of another—po-
tentially not wrongful—conviction in the future.
325. See Henning, supra note 4, at 453–56.
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I. Conceptualizing the Cumulative Effect
The disadvantages faced by youth, and particularly youth of
Color, build across each point of system processing, so that we can
only guess at the true cumulative effect.  It may look something like
this:  A Black teenage boy, sitting in class, gets angry with what he
perceives as disrespect from his teacher in front of the class.  He
throws his earbuds at her in frustration.  She tells him to leave, and
he refuses.  She calls a school resource officer, who brings a sworn
police officer onto the scene.  The officer places the boy under ar-
rest for disturbing school326 and assault and takes him to the police
station.  The prosecutor considers diversion but dismisses it because
this boy does not feel like a good candidate to her (though just that
morning, she diverted a White youth with the same charges).  In-
stead, she decides to file a delinquency petition alleging he resisted
arrest and committed aggravated assault, on the basis that the
earbuds constituted a weapon.  The prosecutor anticipates ulti-
mately reducing the charges, but she uses these initial charges to
gain leverage in plea bargaining.  Given that the charges could be
considered violent, she decides to seek pre-hearing detention,
which she also knows will make plea bargaining smoother.  The
boy’s attorney meets with him only briefly and recommends he take
the deal offered by the prosecutor:  That he admit the allegations
for simple assault, and the prosecutor amends the petition to re-
move the other charges.  The boy does not really understand what
is happening and so decides he should follow his attorney’s recom-
mendation, since he really wants to get out of detention.  The judge
places him on probation.  This youth has now experienced a Type B
wrongful adjudication.  The boy recognizes that almost all the kids
in the juvenile court each time he attends a hearing are Black or
Latinx, and he wonders whether he has been the victim of racial
bias in how the police and prosecutor responded to him.  He be-
comes angry and withdrawn, and starts skipping school.  The judge
threatens him with a probation violation for testing positive for ma-
rijuana in a routine urinalysis, which was one of his probation con-
ditions though he had no documented history of drug use.  His
lawyer does not attend these post-dispositional hearings, and so the
youth’s parents do their best to convince the judge that he is a good
kid who has just hit a rough patch.
Six months later, an armed robbery occurs two blocks away
from the boy’s school, the police are called, and the victim describes
326. See Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 2016), https://bit.ly/38juTJX [https://perma.cc/9QM2-P2YV].
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the perpetrator as a Black teenager.  During a routine patrol later
that evening, the sworn officer who responded to the above inci-
dent in school sees the boy standing on the street corner on which
the armed robbery occurred, talking to his friends.  The officer rec-
ognizes this youth and remembers how disrespectful he was during
the school incident six months before.  He decides to pull the youth
in for questioning.  The youth goes to the police station and waives
his rights, because he does not trust that the police will actually get
him a lawyer even if he asks for one—and because he did not really
trust his public defender, anyway.  Following interrogation, the
youth confesses to the armed robbery, even though he was not in-
volved.  He assumes it will all get sorted out later, and the police
tell him he can go home if he tells them he was involved.  School
records show that he was not present in class when the robbery
occurred.  Based on this evidence and given that this is now argua-
bly the youth’s second violent offense, the prosecutor successfully
seeks judicial waiver of the youth into the adult system.  Based on
the boy’s confession and prior delinquency adjudication, his attor-
ney tells him he is unlikely to win at trial and strongly encourages
that he take a deal.  The prosecutor offers one year incarceration in
exchange for a guilty plea, given the youth’s prior offending.  Be-
cause he faces a much longer sentence if convicted at trial, the boy
accepts the deal even though he continues to assert his innocence.
During the plea colloquy, the youth does not follow what is happen-
ing, but his attorney has told him to say “yes” every time the judge
asks if he understands something.  As part of the plea, without un-
derstanding that he is doing so, the boy waives his appellate rights.
He serves a year in jail.  He has now experienced a Type A wrong-
ful conviction. Because of this conviction, his school expels him,
and when he leaves jail he drops out.  He is unable to get a job
because of his lack of a high school diploma and his criminal record.
Although this account is fictional, extant research makes clear
that this is not beyond the realm of possibility.  The cumulative dis-
advantages build in ways similar to this, compounding to increas-
ingly reduce a youth’s chances of success.  To seek justice for youth
who are wrongfully convicted, then, means seeking to disrupt the
negative impact at each stage of processing—and seeking to more
fully understand how these forces shape the trajectory of actual sys-
tem-involved youth.
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IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
RESEARCH, LEGAL PRACTICE, AND POLICY IN
ADDRESSING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF YOUTH
Compounding disadvantage increases the likelihood of wrong-
ful conviction of youth—especially youth of Color, and most espe-
cially Black youth—across every stage of justice processing.
Therefore, change is critically needed to reduce the number of
youth whose lives are derailed when they never should have been
involved in the system to begin with.  To best combat wrongful con-
victions of youth, change must occur in at least three domains:  Re-
search, practice, and policy.
A. Research
Although we present a framework for thinking through the cu-
mulative disadvantage faced by young, Black defendants who are
wrongfully charged, this framework in some cases represents only
educated guesses about the ways in which youthfulness, race, and
system involvement interact to push youth toward conviction or ad-
judication.  Unfortunately, much of the research and scholarship in
these areas has tackled only one—at most, two—of these variables
at a time.327  We, along with many of our psychology and law col-
leagues, have, as peer reviewers for academic journals or members
of thesis or dissertation committees, pushed for an inclusion of race
in research designs intended to explore plea bargaining, interroga-
tions, or other aspects of justice involvement.  Too often, these rec-
ommendations are ignored because the inclusion of race
“unnecessarily complicates the research design” or “is not neces-
sary for an initial study on x or y topic.”328  Certainly, we are not
327. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
328. As Stevenson, Bottoms & Burke explain,
[P]sychologists have been slow to explore how American institutions con-
tribute to systematic racial oppression, focusing instead almost exclu-
sively on basic cognitive components of racism and prejudice (e.g.,
categorization, implicit attitudes). . . .  Although other social scientists
have embraced the goals in King’s call [for psychologists to examine ra-
cism and prejudice within complex real-world contexts] by incorporating
critical race theory, context, and intersectionality into their research, psy-
chologists by and large, have not.  And those who have are sometimes
marginalized, considered “do-gooders” uninterested in “basic science.”
In turn, high-quality psychological research on the topic of racial minority
youth within the legal system is sparse and has only recently become
more mainstream.
Margaret C. Stevenson, Bette L. Bottoms, & Kelly C. Burke, The Legacy of Ra-
cism for Children’s Interactions with the Law: Exploring Themes with Psychological
Science, in THE LEGACY OF RACISM FOR CHILDREN: PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, & PUB-
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the first researchers to note the profoundly problematic colorblind
nature of a research literature, nor is this problem unique to psy-
chology and the law.329  However, within the field of legal psychol-
ogy, the failure to grapple with the impact of race on any aspect of
the justice system is inexcusable.  In critiquing extant research, we
include our own work, and invite our colleagues to join us in criti-
cally examining what we study and how we study it.
We must, therefore, move away from the impulse to create
straightforward research designs that do not account for the compli-
cating factors that actually shape people’s experiences within the
system; such designs produce easily interpretable data, but at the
cost of the data having full relevance and application to the system
as it truly exists.  Rather than attempt to create a single narrative
that applies to everyone and instead creating a narrative that, in
truth, applies to no one,330 it is time for our field to embrace the
nuance of people’s lived experiences in the way we design our re-
search and in the conclusions we draw.  By bringing together differ-
LIC POLICY 1, 5 (Margaret C. Stevenson, Bette L. Bottoms & Kelly C. Burke eds.,
2020).
329. Within psychology and law, see, e.g., Jennifer Woolard, Engaging Sci-
ence, Engaging Justice, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY-LAW SOCIETY (Mar. 2016), https:/
/bit.ly/2OakfOG [https://perma.cc/2DXF-E5X5]; R. T. Carter & J. M. Forsyth, Ex-
amining Race and Culture in Psychology Journals: The Case of Forensic Psychol-
ogy, 38 PRO. PSYCH.: RSCH & PRAC. 133 (2007); THE LEGACY OF RACISM FOR
CHILDREN: PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, & PUBLIC POLICY 5 (Margaret C. Stevenson,
Bette L. Bottoms & Kelly C. Burke eds., 2020); Haley M. Cleary, Applying the
Lessons of Developmental Psychology to the Study of Juvenile Interrogations: New
Directions for Research, Policy, and Practice, 23 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 118
(2017). Outside of psychology and law, many fields have been called to grapple
with their colorblind methodologies, the ways in which race is included in research
designs, and the racial bias within the field. See generally, e.g., Matthew O. Hunt,
Pamela Braboy Jackson, Brian Powell & Lara Carr Steelman, Color-Blind: The
Treatment of Race and Ethnicity in Social Psychology, 63 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 352
(2000); Eric P. Baumer, Reassessing and Redirecting Research on Race and Sen-
tencing, 30 JUST. Q. 231 (2013); Nasar Meer & Anoop Nayak, Race Ends Where?
Race, Racism & Contemporary Sociology, 49 SOCIO. NP3 (2015); Meda Chesney-
Lind & Nicholas Chagnon, Criminology, Gender, & Race: A Case Study of Privi-
lege in the Academy, 11 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 311 (2016).
330. For readers familiar with statistical analysis, one way to think about it is
that there may be an interaction effect between race or youthful status and many
of the variables we study that shape wrongful convictions; when we fail to include
these variables as a central part of our research designs, we find significant main
effects, but we miss the interaction effect.  We interpret the main effect, believing
it explains the phenomenon we are studying, but given the presence of the interac-
tion effect, the main effect is misleading—it presents, for example, the average
experience across Black and White defendants, in cases in which both groups’ ex-
perience may be so markedly different from the main effect that the average is
meaningless.  When we leave out these critical identity variables, we risk wrongly
generalizing data that only apply to one group.
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ent research methodologies—qualitative research, mixed methods
approaches, community-based participatory research, policy analy-
sis—we can better address the messiness inherent to this work and
ensure we are asking the right questions.  In so doing, we will build
a research literature that can meaningfully identify needed reforms
and may manage to avoid the criticism so often levied against our
work by lawyers, judges, and legislators—that it is out of touch with
the realities of the system.  This may mean that researchers no
longer design research on the justice system without engaging sys-
tem stakeholders—lawyers, judges, legislators, and impacted com-
munity members—in decisions of methodology and in data
interpretation.
In addition to calling for researchers in this area to always in-
clude race and, when appropriate, youthfulness in conceptualizing
any aspect of justice processing, we also join our colleagues’ recent
call for research integrating multiple stages of justice system
processing.331  Echoing the words of Scherr et al.:
[W]e do not advocate that all projects must simultaneously ex-
amine all aspects of the framework but rather that projects incor-
porate more than a single temporal point and their interactive
effects.  In so doing, a body of research can help to delineate how
innocents move from one disadvantageous stage to another and
to provide a model of their growing disadvantage, all serving as
the basis of reform.332
Of course, in echoing this call, we expand it:  Research must
not only consider the cumulative disadvantage of innocence, but
rather all wrongful charging—charging of those who should never
have been justice involved.  By expanding our focus beyond convic-
tions of those who are factually innocent to instead embrace the
importance of understanding the mechanisms underlying all wrong-
ful convictions, whether due to factual innocence or inappropriate
criminalization, we will be able to inform system change that
reaches a far greater number of defendants.  It is important, as a
field, that our research represent our values and that we recognize
that the number of lives unjustly caught up in the system go beyond
those who are factually innocent.333  In making these shifts, we
would conduct research that can provide a foundation for justice
331. Scherr et al., supra note 8, at 373–74.
332. Id.
333. For example, the mission of the American Psychology-Law Society, the
primary professional organization of legal psychology researchers, “is to enhance
well-being, justice, and human rights through the science and practice of psychol-
ogy in legal contexts,” and the organization’s core values include social justice,
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not just for the Huwes in our society, but also the Michaels.  If we
fail to prioritize research on Type B wrongful convictions, and fail
to account for the cumulative disadvantage of race in wrongful con-
victions of innocent youth, we fail to meaningfully address the dis-
proportionate criminalization of people of Color we have long
decried.
B. Practice
As the relevant research literature continues to develop, re-
search and scholarship to date make clear a number of changes to
practice for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges that could
substantively reduce the likelihood of wrongful charging and
wrongful convictions of both types.  Given that each of these legal
system actors hold significant discretion, individuals (and individual
offices) can make changes now in how they handle youths’ cases
within the juvenile and criminal justice systems to reduce the likeli-
hood of wrongful outcomes.  As an initial step, all systems actors
should actively seek to identify their own biases and the ways in
which those biases may—often inadvertently—shape their work.
Additionally, the following concrete steps would likely substan-
tively improve outcomes for many youth who wrongfully become
system-involved.
1. Prosecutors
Prosecutors have a meaningful role in addressing wrongful
charging and wrongful convictions of youth of both the types delin-
eated in this Article.  First, prosecutors hold profound discretion in
deciding whether—and how—to charge a youth who someone ac-
cuses of wrongdoing.334  Therefore, prosecutors can, and should,
decline to prosecute or dismiss charges against a youth when they
have serious questions either about the youth’s factual guilt or
about the need for system involvement.335  Second, prosecutors
must move away from common practices of overcharging youth as
leverage in negotiations in plea deals or to facilitate transfer to the
adult system.336  Instead, prosecutors should shift their approach to
plea bargaining to be consistent with adolescent development and
diversity, and inclusion. AP-LS Mission, Vision and Core Values, AM. PSYCH.-L.
SOC’Y (2013), https://bit.ly/3bKZ2E9 [https://perma.cc/78J2-AWP7].
334. See Henning, supra note 4, at 430.
335. See id. at 456–60.
336. See Fountain & Woolard, supra note 187, at 198.
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to prioritize positive youth outcomes.337  Third, prosecutors should
aim to reduce or eliminate transfer of youth to the adult system,
both by choosing to exercise prosecutorial discretion to process
youth in the juvenile system in cases of dual jurisdiction, and by
choosing not to seek judicial waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction.
This would avoid pushing youth who may have been wrongfully
charged deeper into the system and would increase the likelihood
of positive youth outcomes.338  Fourth, once a court adjudicates de-
linquent or convicts a youth, prosecutors should seek to maintain
youth within the community whenever possible, avoiding incarcer-
ating youth who may be caught in a cycle of system involvement
triggered by an initial, wrongful conviction.339  Finally, prosecutor
offices should develop office procedures for identifying and reme-
dying wrongful convictions and wrongful juvenile adjudications,
which are presently much more likely to go undiscovered and un-
remedied.340  These policies should include procedures for routinely
reviewing whether case outcomes and decision making differ by de-
fendant race.  Although the system ultimately requires more global
reform, these steps would begin to shift the needle on the number
of children and adolescents wrongfully convicted each year, and the
impact of those wrongful convictions on youths’ lives.341
2. Defense Attorneys
Defense attorneys exercise much less discretion in the outcome
of a case than prosecutors or judges.  However, defense attorneys
do exercise discretion in the way they approach the defense of any
one youth and in the amount of resources they devote to a case.342
337. Alexandra Cohen, Erika Fountain, Emily Haney-Caron & Gail Rosen-
baum, Juvenile Pleas: A Developmentally Informed Approach for Prosecutors,
https://bit.ly/3qIdYXy [https://perma.cc/R5HV-D3D5] (last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
338. See supra notes 180–202 and accompanying text.
339. See supra Section III.G.
340. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 321 (noting that, as of 2007, Inno-
cence Projects had not taken on a single case from juvenile court, given the com-
mon practice of focusing on cases with the most severe sanctions); see also Tepfer
et al., supra note 25, at 922 (discussing the need for innocence-based post-convic-
tion remedies for youth).
341. Some prosecutor offices have begun shifting office policies to be more in
line with developmental science and youth needs, though overall, much work re-
mains to be done.  For an example, see Press Release, Philadelphia Dist. Att’y’s
Off., Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner Announces Juvenile Justice Re-
forms, JUST. WIRE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://bit.ly/38ztRJQ [https://perma.cc/DYT5-
CRNE].
342. We acknowledge that defense attorneys, and maybe especially attorneys
who represent youth, are chronically under-resourced and often are unable to pro-
vide the level of zealous representation they would like to provide. See Drizin &
Luloff, supra note 21, at 289–91.  Structural reform of the resources devoted to
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First, defense attorneys should provide the same level of adversarial
defense to every client, youth or adult, and should provide that
level of defense regardless of whether the case is in juvenile or
criminal court.343  This would mean conducting full interviews with
every youth client, conducting pre-trial or pre-plea investigation
when warranted, filing pretrial motions, and filing appeals.344  Sec-
ond, defense attorneys should bring adolescent development sci-
ence, and the relevant social science literature, into their advocacy
for all youth, at all stages—in arguing against pretrial detention,
questioning youth competency, evaluating whether a youth under-
stands a plea, attempting to suppress a confession, or advocating for
a youth’s disposition to keep them within the community.345  Third,
to provide zealous representation and to reduce wrongful convic-
tions of youth, public defender offices should create office norms
around appealing adjudications of delinquency or criminal court
convictions of youth even when the sanction the youth faces is rela-
tively minor.346  Robust appellate practices will create a mechanism
for uncovering and trying to reduce the harm from wrongful convic-
tions of youth when they do occur.  Fourth, defense attorneys—in-
dividually and as an office practice—should track case outcomes
and the quality of the attorney-client relationship for young clients
and explore whether outcomes differ by client race.347  In doing so,
attorneys may be able to identify when bias—their own or someone
else’s—is shaping outcomes for youth and develop creative strate-
gies for reducing the disparate impact of wrongful convictions on
youth of Color.  Together, these steps would make it more challeng-
ing for the system to turn wrongful charging into wrongful convic-
public defense is critically needed to enable defenders to fully implement the
changes in representation that are needed.  However, we offer these recommenda-
tions as a starting point for defense attorneys to implement as much as possible
given the resources with which they work.
343. See supra Section III.F.2.
344. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 290–91; see generally Randy Hertz,
Martin Guggenheim & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Trial Manual for Defense Attor-
neys in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR. (2020), https://bit.ly/
3br14ce [https://perma.cc/48FS-M998].
345. See generally, e.g., Kristin N. Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights:
Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2005); Child & Adolescent Development, NAT’L JUV.
DEF. CTR., https://bit.ly/3rtf0Ie [https://perma.cc/NNZ2-S8S5] (last visited Jan. 28,
2021).  Juvenile defenders should “be knowledgeable of the science and research
regarding child and adolescent development, and [ ] integrate it strategically in
their daily practice.” Id.
346. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 320.
347. See supra Section III.F.2.
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tion and would potentially shift court norms in a direction of all
system actors focusing more on youth rights.
3. Judges
Judges in juvenile court are the ultimate gatekeepers for ensur-
ing that youth are not wrongfully adjudicated, and those in criminal
court can shape the procedures that make a wrongful conviction
more or less likely.  Judges working within juvenile or criminal
court must familiarize themselves with research on adolescent de-
velopment, youth functioning within the justice system, and racial
disparities within justice system processing as an initial step in re-
ducing the cumulative disadvantage system-involved youth experi-
ence.348  Next, armed with this research—particularly on youth
competence, confessions, plea comprehension, and outcomes fol-
lowing transfer to the adult system—judges should take very seri-
ously their responsibility in preventing wrongful convictions by
exercising their gatekeeping role related to admission of confes-
sions, accepting pleas, allowing youth to proceed to adjudication,
and waiving juvenile court jurisdiction.  Third, judges should seek
to reduce youth detention and incarceration with the recognition
that these worsen youth outcomes and, for youth who have been
wrongfully charged, increase the likelihood of a future, not wrong-
ful, system involvement.349  These approaches together have the po-
tential to both avoid wrongful conviction for youth who are
wrongfully charged and reduce the negative impact of wrongful
conviction on youth who are factually innocent or who have been
inappropriately criminalized.
C. Policy
A large body of research and scholarship has identified critical
policy reforms needed to reduce the likelihood of Type A wrongful
convictions, both in general and for youth.  We echo these calls
from our colleagues.  As Scherr, Redlich, and Kassin identified, in-
terrogation protections are critical, for all suspects but especially for
youth:  Suspects should not be required to self-invoke Miranda
rights but instead should not be questioned unless their rights are
explicitly waived; police should never be permitted to lie to or mis-
lead suspects; all interrogations should be video recorded.350  Addi-
tionally, new rules are needed to curb the risk of false guilty pleas,
348. Tepfer et al., supra note 25, at 923–24.
349. See supra Sections III.D and III.G.
350. Scherr et al., supra note 8, at 37–72.
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including open-file discovery rules that ensure a defendant fully un-
derstands the case against them before making a decision to accept
a plea.351  As Drizin & Luloff recommend, the law on youth Mi-
randa waiver must catch up to the science, such that children and
adolescents never face interrogation without the presence of an at-
torney.352  Once youth have been charged, they must have zealous
advocacy throughout the process, with a non-waivable right to an
attorney who has actually received developmentally informed train-
ing on how to work effectively with youth.353  Additionally, Hen-
ning’s recommendations lay out a clear path toward reducing Type
B wrongful convictions:  Prosecutorial discretion in charging youth
must be narrowed and channeled, such that prosecutors are re-
quired to apply a developmental lens to their conceptualizations of
all youth, not just White youth or wealthy youth.354  Prosecutors
should be required by statute to document and periodically publicly
report aggregated data on their charging decisions, including the
decision to dismiss, divert, or formally prosecute, the factors that
went into the decision, and how charging varies by defendant race
and neighborhood.355  In addition to these reforms, we call atten-
tion to three systemic reforms we believe are most critical for re-
ducing wrongful convictions of both types, especially for youth of
Color:  Policing reform, prevention and intervention for at-risk
youth, and youth representation post-disposition.
1. Policing Reform
In conceptualizing how disadvantage builds across each stage
of justice involvement, we kept returning to one important reality:
Without wrongful charging, there are no wrongful convictions.
Recommendations for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges
can attempt to reduce the likelihood that a youth wrongfully sus-
pected ultimately becomes wrongfully convicted, but no matter
what these legal actors do, they cannot ameliorate the harm of po-
lice contact.  As described above,356 arresting youth who are factu-
ally innocent or who have done nothing wrong beyond normal
teenage behavior causes profound harm, even if prosecutors choose
not to proceed.  In our current approach to policing, “[g]iven our
obsession with security and safety in inner-city areas, consistent
351. Id.
352. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 313–15.
353. Id. at 315.
354. Henning, supra note 4, at 436–49.
355. Id. at 446–49.
356. See supra Sections III.A–B.
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with neoliberal policies, and the expansion of the criminal legal sys-
tem to urban schools, coupled with a retreat of the welfare state, it
is [ ] innocent youth who remain at risk of being sacrificed on the
altar of public safety.”357  Once we criminalize these youth, their
experiences of criminalization in fact create more crime.358
The most impactful policy shift, then, would be to radically
change policing practices to drastically reduce youth contact with
police and arrests.  Any meaningful reform must be a top-down
shift in policing priorities and values.  Recent legislation proposed
in multiple states would make it so that police officers cannot inter-
rogate a youth unless public safety is at imminent danger;359 these
bills would protect youth from false confession but cannot undo the
harm of initial police contact.  One possible solution would be for
state legislatures to extend this prohibition earlier than interroga-
tion, such that police cannot arrest youth unless the youth’s safety
or public safety is at imminent risk.  This recommendation would
not appreciably limit police power to protect communities or re-
spond to serious crime.  Police may arrest young suspects in any
cases of violent crime that the youth could possibly repeat.  In cases
in which youth were engaging in serious criminal conduct not
presenting a public safety risk, officers may issue the youth a cita-
tion and initiate juvenile or criminal justice proceedings, but with-
out creating the pressures—interrogation, pre-trial detention—that
push youth toward pleading guilty to something they did not do.  If
youth were engaging in minor delinquency, officers could work with
a youth’s family as needed to connect the youth to intervention ser-
vices within the community, without the trauma of arrest and with-
out the iatrogenic effect of justice involvement; we describe this
possibility more in the next recommendation.  As impacted commu-
nities call for abolition of traditional models of policing,360 this re-
form would be an important and necessary step toward providing
decriminalized responses to noncriminal behavior.
2. Prevention and Intervention for At-Risk Youth
A shift away from arresting and prosecuting youth does not
mean ignoring juvenile crime.  Instead, we could shift resources
357. Claudio G. Vera Sanchez & Ericka B. Adams, Sacrificed on the Altar of
Public Safety: The Policing of Latino and African American Youth, 27 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 322, 338 (2011).
358. See supra Section III.A.
359. E.g., S.B. 2800, 2021–2022 Leg., Sess. (N.Y. 2021); H.B. 315, 442d Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
360. See generally, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police)
Reform, 108 CAL. L. REV. 1781 (2020).
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away from prosecution and toward developing effective, evidence-
based supports and interventions for youth and their families that
operate outside the legal system.  Henning explains, “Efforts to re-
duce racial disparities in juvenile court are not likely to succeed
without adequate community-based, adolescent-appropriate alter-
natives to prosecution.”361  Neither, we believe, will efforts to re-
duce Type B wrongful convictions succeed without effective
community prevention and intervention services.  Ideally, such a
shift in funding would involve “realignment of financial resources in
communities of color from traditional law enforcement interven-
tions to efforts designed to improve failing schools, dilapidated
housing, mental health services, family counseling, and drug treat-
ment,”362 giving communities the support needed to both prevent
and respond effectively to youth delinquency without court inter-
vention.  Calls for reconceptualizing justice system responses away
from a criminalization/police-driven model and toward effective
community intervention are not new.363  Freeing up financial re-
sources by reducing police contact with youth would allow for ro-
bust investment in programing associated with improved, rather
than worsened, outcomes for youth.364  Doing so would protect
youth from both types of wrongful convictions by disrupting the
processes that typically turn youth into suspects, both for serious
conduct they did not commit and for minor conduct that should
never have been criminalized.
361. Henning, supra note 4, at 456.
362. Id. at 457.
363. See generally S’Lee Arthur Hinshaw II, Juvenile Diversion: An Alterna-
tive to Juvenile Court, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 305 (1993); Joseph J. Cocozza et al.,
Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System: The Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment
Center Post-Arrest Diversion Program, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 935 (2005);
Edgar Cahn & Cynthia Robbins, An Offer They Can’t Refuse: Racial Disparity in
Juvenile Justice and Deliberate Indifference Meet Alternatives that Work, 13 U. D.C.
L. REV. 71 (2010); Traci Schlesinger, Decriminalizing Racialized Youth through
Juvenile Diversion, 28 FUTURE OF CHILD. 59 (2018), Scott Wm. Bowman, The Kids
Are Alright: Making a Case for Abolition of the Juvenile Justice System, 26 CRITI-
CAL CRIMINOLOGY 393 (2018). For a similar call for radically disrupting ap-
proaches to youth justice in the UK, see Stephen Case & Kevin Haines, Abolishing
Youth Justice Systems: Children First, Offenders Nowhere, 0 YOUTH JUSTICE 1
(2020).
364. These approaches must include stakeholders who “view these youth as a
truly vulnerable population, rather than an overwhelming threat” and must under-
stand and address cultural mistrust.  Shantel D. Crosby, Trauma-Informed Ap-
proaches to Juvenile Justice: A Critical Race Perspective, 67 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 5,
12 (2016).
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3. Representation Post-Disposition
As system actors seek to change practices to reduce the num-
ber of youth wrongfully charged and wrongfully convicted, it is crit-
ical to also create a safety net to identify and rectify the wrongful
convictions that still occur.  To that end, we must guarantee access
to legal representation post-disposition for youth both within the
juvenile justice and criminal justice system.365  However, given the
realities of funding of indigent defense, state legislation in every
state must initiate a requirement for free post-disposition counsel
for youth coupled with legislative funding for these legal services.366
This legislation must grant youth processed as juveniles the same
appellate and collateral relief rights as adults.367  For youth who
face a Type A wrongful conviction—youth who are factually inno-
cent—post-disposition counsel will help youth initiate direct ap-
peals and seek habeas relief to have the court overturn their
convictions or adjudications.368  For youth who face a Type B
wrongful conviction—youth who are guilty of nothing more than
typical adolescent risk taking—post-disposition counsel will be able
to advocate for youth to stay within the community or return to the
community as quickly as possible, and can argue for termination of
juvenile court supervision when youth are not actually in need of
intervention.369  Although the ultimate goal should be to eliminate
both Type A and Type B wrongful convictions, a right to post-dis-
position counsel and full access to post-disposition proceedings pro-
vides youth who are wrongfully convicted the chance to have their
rights vindicated and to return to their lives.
CONCLUSION
Individuals who are wrongfully charged face cumulative disad-
vantage within the justice system, compounded at every stage.  So
do youth.  So do people of Color.  When a justice-involved individ-
ual faces all three of these disadvantages, the impact is multiplied,
and research and scholarship to date have only scratched the sur-
face at detailing the intersecting role of race, youthfulness, and
wrongful charging in producing wrongful convictions.  Because
365. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 294–99.
366. Tepfer & Nirider, supra note 310, at 555–63.
367. Id.
368. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 21, at 29.
369. See e.g., NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., JUVENILE DEFENDER POST-DISPOSITION
PRACTICE TOOL 4–6 (2017), bit.ly/2OOTQWJ [https://perma.cc/BT37-4TLY];
MODELS FOR CHANGE, ADDRESSING THE LEGAL NEEDS OF YOUTH AFTER DISPO-
SITION 1–2 (2013), https://bit.ly/3aeuxFd [https://perma.cc/6W32-XNKH].
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there is so much we still do not know, instead of conclusions, we
leave the reader with questions.
How might Huwe Burton’s case have played out differently if
he did not find himself at the intersection of youthfulness and racial
bias in facing his wrongful charging?  If Huwe was not a teenager,
would police pressure compel him to confess?  If he was not Black,
would police have suspected him in the first place?  If he was not a
Black teenager, fitting our popular conceptions of the youthful
superpredator, would he have been convicted?
What about Michael—how might his trajectory have been dif-
ferent if our society did not criminalize normative adolescent mis-
behavior?  Would he have been diverted from formal processing if
he was White?  Would he have pled “involved” if he had adult deci-
sion-making capacities, or more robust legal representation?  How
might the sanction the court imposed be different if he had been an
adult charged with the same behavior, or if he was not Black?  And
if he had been diverted from formal processing, would he have gone
on to be arrested again in the future?
What would it have meant for Huwe and for Michael if police
had not arrested them in the first place? What would it mean for
us—as researchers, practitioners, and policymakers—to be as con-
cerned about what happened to Michael as about what happened to
Huwe? Until we can grapple with these questions, we cannot begin
to achieve justice for our youth.
